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EDITORIAL

THE word " crisis " is in a fair way to becoming as characteristic of this period as " evolution " or " progress " was characteristic of the period that ended in 1914. The events of last September are now described as *the* crisis—a description that may prove to be no less optimistic than the Great War as a title for the war of 1914-18. Christians have an interest in the word " crisis " that was lacking in the case of " evolution " or " progress." For crisis is one of the key words of Scripture. True, it will not be found in Cruden's concordance; but that is because it is rendered by " judgment " in the English Bible. The relation between the two words is worth considering. When we speak of a crisis to-day—an international or industrial or domestic crisis—our use of the word is derived from its reference to the point in an illness when a change takes place which is decisive of recovery or death. From this it has come to signify any kind of turning-point when a marked change for better or worse is imminent. Crisis thus conveys the idea of danger to man, not (as in the New Testament) of judgment by God. It bespeaks a threat of suffering, not the presence of sin. The distinction illustrates the difference between the secularist and the Christian attitude to events. Those of us who profess to be Christians will miss the point of the distinction unless we realize how far our own attitude to events has been corroded by secularism, and how deeply we are ourselves involved in what it is our business to criticize. Our own natural reactions to a crisis are anything but Scriptural in character. Repentance must begin in the household of God.

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Both the fear that preceded September 30 and the relief that followed were inspired by danger imminent and then averted, not by divine judgment apprehended and then accepted. The threat of suffering was for the time being removed; but, because the sin went unrepented and the judgment of God unacknowledged, it is difficult to believe

that the wave of thanksgiving which carried people into the churches after the crisis was any more well-pleasing to God than the wave of fear which carried them there beforehand. The Church for the moment provided a mouthpiece for the pent-up sentiments of the people, sentiments which naturally enough it shared with the people. That this should have happened is not surprising. In a sense it is suitable. But ought the Church to have failed so completely to interpret the crisis to the people in terms of divine judgment? It failed to do that at the time, and the belated and half-hearted attempts to do it subsequently on the part of ecclesiastical leaders assembled at Lambeth for the purpose have had as little effect as in the circumstances might have been anticipated.

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Nevertheless, even if the Church failed so to interpret the events, divine judgment was in them to be apprehended and acknowledged by any who had eyes to see. While the crisis may have worked no enduring difference in the majority of the people, there is evidence that it had a decisive effect upon some at least in giving them insight into the nature of a situation which was there before and after, but which had to become critical in order that it might be revealed. It is to them that our present remarks are primarily addressed. Nineteenth-century idealism with its post-war Indian summer laid an extraordinary hold upon the British people, a hold which it will take much more than the September crisis to relax. Most people still appear to believe, or succeed in persuading themselves that they still believe, that somehow or other things will come all right. Warnings that our civilization is on the verge of collapse or that it is in process of disintegration have been heard so often and have become so familiar that they pass unheeded. It is difficult, of course, for the elderly and the middle-aged to believe that the present social order is really doomed—the order in which they grew up, which in England at all events survived the shock of the Great War and continues to function with comparatively little overt change, and in which, incidentally, most of them have secured an established institutional position. It is much easier for those who are young and who have never had any occasion to feel buttressed by general stability to realize the impermanence of existing institutions. The present

order is disintegrating because its roots have been cut. This process must work itself out; there is no means of "saving the situation" or of suddenly cutting in like Dr Buchman and working a large-scale miracle. That is why the question "What would you do, if you were in power?" is stupid. But this does not mean that sheer other-worldliness is the only resort of those who believe in the Kingdom of God. What it does mean is that we must be prepared to take a long view and to act upon a long-range policy. We cannot save the present situation, but we can look forward to the social order that will grow out of the ruins of our present civilization. The most that we can do now is to sow seed that will be harvested in a distant future, and even that is an undertaking that will require every bit of spiritual and moral stamina that is left to us. But is not this much more worth doing than trying to keep up the pretence that there is a general remedy immediately available, or that we shall find a secularist utopia waiting round the corner as soon as the present storm has blown over? Even now, within the diseased and decaying body of the old order, cells may be formed out of which a new order will grow.

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The real cleavage between Christians to-day is not along the lines of the old ecclesiastical controversies, although the well-worn arguments are still bandied about in the back-waters of contemporary society. The cleavage is between those who still suppose that the old ecclesiastical and secular institutions are capable of being preserved more or less as they are and that all will be well if they can be so preserved, and those who realize that, while by the grace of God there will be a Christian renaissance, that will come to pass only after a bitter passion and perhaps a terrible death. It is untrue to call this pessimism, unless we call the Christ a pessimist as in the Gospel He predicts His own passion. Only when we apprehend something of the impending cost —to the Church as the body of Christ—of the redemption of society shall we be able to taste the real joy that is set before us. It is, we believe, against such a background of conviction that Christians to-day not only must envisage the long-range objective that ought to determine present strategy, but also must fix upon the immediate tasks that are most worth while. It is foolish to waste the limited

resources that are available in attempting to keep all the existing institutions functioning when the heart has gone out of them. It is imperative that we shall decide what enterprises over a long period may reasonably be expected to contribute to the growth of a new Christian civilization and concentrate upon them. By a Christian civilization we do not mean the kingdom of heaven on earth, but an order of society which provides as full opportunity for human life, that is for Christian living, as conditions in this world permit. Such a radical reorientation of Christian strategy —disturbing as would be its effects within the Churches— would enlist the co-operation of many who have moved (though they themselves may as yet be unaware of the fact) almost the full circle from the Christian tradition.

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The official pronouncements of Church leaders in England fall flat or worse because they are rightly judged to be on the wrong side of the cleavage. We are far from saying that this is the case with the Church leaders as individual persons. But when they meet together officially as representatives of existing institutions, the logic of their position scarcely allows them to cut the ground from under their own feet. The recent Lambeth " encyclicals " seem platitudinous because they are the utterances of men who feel that in their official capacity they ought to say something, not of men who as individuals know that they are bound to say this particular thing, devastating as will be its consequences both for themselves and for the institutions which they represent. By comparison with these official pronouncements the series of Crisis Booklets which is being issued by the Student Christian Movement Press[1] may be recommended to enquirers who want to know what the Church has to say about the present situation. There is no deceptive sense of security about them, and there is a clear recognition that Christians now have to think through and to live through—instead of hoping to prevent—the end of an era. " Modern civilization is built upon the sand," writes Mr Hugh Martin in a general introduction to the series, " and it ought to cause the Christian no

[1] *The Crisis and the Christian*, by Nathaniel Micklem. *The Crisis and Democracy*, by J. Eric Fenn. *What does "A" do Next?*, by F. A. Cockin. 1s. each.

surprise to find it collapsing. We must not let our thankfulness at escape from the immediate danger of war blind us to the real facts of the situation and the threatened disintegration of society, not through its replacement by a Christian order, which would be cause for rejoicing, but by one even less representative of Christian ideals."

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Mr Eric Fenn in *The Crisis and Democracy* is concerned to interpret what the crisis revealed as to the British attitude to democracy. Not only did it show that we no longer regard democracy as a general principle worth fighting for, but it made more clear than it has been heretofore that we ourselves are on the way to our own form of totalitarianism. It is too late now to prevent this process from continuing. Is not the nature of a machine society such as sooner or later to produce this effect? For Christians who have been wont to look upon democracy as a matter of principle, two questions at once become urgent: (1) What precisely were the Christian values which rightly or wrongly we supposed to be bound up with a democratic form of government? And (2) have we sufficient moral and spiritual force, sufficient imagination, to sustain and defend those values within a society which, even if it is still democratic in form, will be totalitarian in method and intention? "It will be necessary for a great new effort of Christian thinking to be made as we face this unknown future."

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The effort will necessarily be new because, since the Great War, the Churches in this country have with a singular unanimity and persistency hitched their waggon to the democratic ideal, and in particular to its ideological consummation in the League of Nations. The fact that they misjudged the situation then naturally renders their judgment now suspect, and it does not make the future task of Christian thinkers any easier. But it is positive guidance, we shall be told, for which people are asking now, and not destructive criticism or an exposure of past mistakes. We must not, however, allow ourselves or anyone else to suppose that we shall be able to frame a right policy until we have reached a much clearer and profounder insight into all that has produced the impasse in which we now find ourselves. As Dr Micklem says, "we are in so great a tangle of sin that whatever we do now is sinful . . . there is no innocence

for men or nations who have put themselves in a position where every possible action or inaction must do further wrong." Only as by a renewal of Christian imagination and by the hard labour of thought we begin to win a true understanding of the present crisis in Christian culture, shall we be in a position to see what positive action is now necessary and upon what enterprises attention ought to be concentrated. A demand for positive guidance is often a demand for a way of escape, a demand that someone else shall do our thinking for us. We have, each of us, both to learn afresh what the Christian Gospel is in its permanent integrity, and also to apprehend the historical process that has brought us to this pass. This is an undertaking upon which all thoughtful Christians can embark without waiting for any further lead.[1] Some, of course, are doing it already. We should anticipate that the most fruitful thinking will be done by small groups of lay men and women, assisted perhaps but not dominated or presided over by a priest. We would add that groups or cells of this kind are more likely to receive the insight which they seek if they are also engaging in some costly action together —for instance, if they are sharing in the responsibility of providing hospitality for refugees.

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Dr Micklem's booklet, *The Crisis and the Christian*, is less of a coherent argument than Mr Fenn's, but there is a refreshing spontaneity and an unpretentious candour about his reflections on the situation. The Christian reader will find here a provocative indication of the data which he must take into account in deciding not only what he ought to think, but what he ought to do. The crisis made it easier for us to realize that we are living in " the last times " —in an eschatological situation. The political crisis of the moment lit up the eternal crisis of Calvary. But how are we henceforth to live eschatologically? That is the question. It is idle to expect the Church as an institution suddenly to begin to do that for us, and it is idle to pretend that we have any natural desire or capacity to do it ourselves. But already our fellow-Christians in Germany and Russia are learning what it is to live in that way. Can Christians in England begin so to live by a voluntary consecration,

[1] In this connexion we would again call attention to M. Maritain's book *True Humanism*, which was reviewed in last month's THEOLOGY.

or shall we wait until we too are compelled by force of circumstances? This is not a question that invites or is likely to receive any general answer as by a mass movement, but it is a question that may be begun to be answered at once in action not only by Christians as individuals, but in a variety of communal ways. It is, for example, open to Christian families, or to small groups of persons who are associated through a common vocation or by residence in the same locality, to bind themselves together in a new determination both to think out what Christian living means in modern society and to make common, costly and adventurous experiments in the practical expression of this determination. "If we would repent," says Dr Micklem, "we must consider again, in the light of the teaching of our Lord, the way we spend our money, the way we spend our time, the nature of our prayers." That sounds simple enough. But any group of Christians who set themselves to do that in deadly earnest will soon find themselves carried out of their depth, and will it not be just then that they will begin to receive together from the highest of all sources the positive guidance for which they ask, and to prove that the leadership which they seek in vain from existing institutions is accessible to anyone who will take the consequences of repenting and believing the Gospel?

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Is what has been said too general and abstract? It is, and it is not. It is useless except in so far as it can be filled with particular and concrete content; the time for using words, which there is no possibility of implementing in action, is past. But the content or the implementary action will not be precisely the same for any two Christians or groups of Christians, and too definite illustrations of what is being attempted or of what might be attempted are at this stage of doubtful value since they may restrict spontaneity and variety of experiment. Canon Cockin's booklet in the same series, *What does "A" do Next?*, does, however, go further than we have been able to go here in enquiring into the actual implications of this attitude to the present situation. We recommend it as a manual for self-examination before or during Lent.

The Scope of Theology

"ALL down but nine; set them up in the other alley, pard." Such was the unforgettable reply of one of Mark Twain's characters to a very innocent and simply phrased attempt at explanation by a parson, upon whom he had called in order to arrange for a friend's funeral. And such, though perhaps less picturesquely phrased, is likely to be the reply of the ordinary well-meaning Christian of to-day who asks what this theology may be all about and is told (to quote an admirable definition given by Dr Adam) that it "is the science which by right use of reason, in accordance with proper scientific method, correlates, systematizes, and organizes the matter of human religious experience in such a way as to reach a unified body of coherent doctrine, fitted to satisfy the mind's demand for truth and to furnish guidance for the practical life." All down but nine, unquestionably, and the end of skittles for plenty of would-be players. But it is quite possible to set them up in the other alley, and to see whether we cannot revive interest in the game again.

For theology is nothing more or less than talking about God, and as God is not merely an interesting subject of conversation, but, in the end, everything that matters in this world or out of it, people really do want to talk about Him, so long as they are quite free to ask their own questions and so long as the answers are in terms which they can understand. Probably that means that the answers must be largely in terms of conduct, for words that do not issue in some sort of action are always obscure. Theology would not be simplified at all if it were written out in words of one syllable, for even the words which a child can spell may suffice to puzzle the philosopher, and their meaning, alike for the philosopher and the child, is ultimately derived from their use in the affairs of daily life. The language of the opening verses of the Fourth Gospel is simple enough, but it would remain void and powerless if it were not for the narratives that follow, and for the living experience of the early Church, in whose fellowship and worship those narratives found form and force. In a phrase, it is more true to say that the significance of theology proceeds from the Incarnation, and is disclosed by the events which constitute the Incarnation as a fact of history, than that the

significance of the Incarnation flows from right theological thinking. Life is more than our thinking about life, and God is more than our thinking about God.

This is what makes theology not only inevitable but exciting. The point has recently been made so well and so vividly by Miss Dorothy Sayers in *The Greatest Drama ever Staged* that it is difficult to escape from a mere repetition of what she has said. That there should be a God, and that that God, the Creator and Sustainer of all this universe, should have a Son, so close and so dear to Him as to be One with Himself, and that that Son should come and live a human life in order to show us what God is like, so that we too may love and trust Him; that this life should end in a tragic and disastrous rejection by man and a death upon a cross, and that even this should not destroy God's purpose, but ensure it, through a Resurrection which has shattered death's power—all this surely is at least exciting. If it is not news, no news is worth the telling. It is not only drama, and even great drama, for drama does not necessarily affect our lives, but, as Clement of Alexandria said, " saving drama," an action which is the final key to all our hopes and needs. All that Christian theology does is to help us to realize more fully and adequately the bearing of this thing that has happened. We have come to accept the fact of the Incarnation in all sorts of ways. For most people faith does not come by any process of argument but by an inner certainty of the spirit which is more akin to the æsthetic vision of the artist or the personal assurance of the lover than to any rationality of judgment. But however we have come to accept the fact we are bound to accept it as affecting everything that there is—life, and death, and that that is beyond death. The Christian may not know that he is a theologian, and may even (with very good reason, in view of the quarrelsomeness of those who in every period have set theology before faith) have a sincere dislike of the name, but if he is truly a Christian he is thinking theologically whenever he thinks about God, and his every action, not only in prayer and worship but in ordinary everyday affairs, is theologically guided.

It is for that reason that a sound theology is absolutely necessary to right living. And there never was a world that more needed a sound theology than the world of to-day. For it is not only a diseased world, but a world threatened by remedies at least as grave as the disease. The trouble is

one that lies far deeper than the political injustices and inequalities and fears and suspicions which form the more obvious substance of our present distress. At that level a multitude of diagnoses are possible, and a multitude of remedies, all equally certain to be ineffectual, can be and are being suggested. But the radical disorder is strictly one of theology, as indeed may be seen plainly enough from the fact that each of the ideologies which is powerful in the conflicts of the nations has very much of the character of a religion, and even at times gives rise to new religious formulations or to a recrudescence of ancient cults. The psychologist finds it easier to understand these than the politician does to control them. What is fundamentally at stake is the whole conception of God, and of this world-order, including time itself, as interpreted by that conception. The entire emphasis to-day is upon the dominance of time, and therefore upon the need to find a satisfaction of human emotions and desires within the historical time-series, and, so far as the individual is concerned, within the limits of this life. God is thus either denied altogether, or brought within history. But such a God as that is not the God of Christianity; nor, for that matter, is He the God of Buddhism, or Hinduism, or of any of the universal religions which represent the deepest response of man's nature to the Unknown. The difference is vital, for neither the objects nor the methods which rule in the political and diplomatic life of the world to-day would be significant or even possible for any nation in which faith in God was effective and dominant. Our trust in bombers and our demand for air-raid shelters is the measure of our lack of a true theology. Bombers and air-raid shelters do not make sense in this universe of which we are a part. Faith in God, if He is the true God, does make sense. And only where there is sense can right action follow.

We do need theology, and urgently, though it will not necessarily be couched in formal and lifeless phraseology. As a matter of fact the real trouble lies rather in the lifelessness of the discussion of particular doctrines than in any irrelevance or lack of direct importance for everyday life in the doctrines themselves. It is always possible to evade the living issues which might lay us under some obligation of loyalty or of action by reducing them to abstract terms and discussing them in a manner which leads to no result except a possible renewal of the discussion at some later

date. Theology is futile enough unless it points in the direction of some possible action, or, more generally, of some possible way of life, and, indeed, unless it is combined with a real effort to follow in the direction indicated. One of the earliest theological formulations of the early Christians was reached when they spoke of their faith as "The Way," and identified the Way with Jesus Himself. They made no mistake about it; the Way was one in which they had to walk, even if it led to martyrdom. Their theology was alive.

Theology is futile also unless it starts from somewhere. One cannot have just a vague theology of religious experience, since it is impossible to find any criterion which will tell us where religious experience begins and where it ends. William James made that point plain beyond all doubting in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Both his own attempts at definition and his examples show quite clearly how uncertain is the borderline between genuinely significant experiences and those which have their origin solely in the inner conflict of emotions. Doubtless the discussion of these problems is itself a branch of theology, but it does not provide theology with its natural starting-point. For that something more objective is necessary, such as the significance of certain historical facts, considered both in themselves and in the various records and institutions which relate them to our own times and lives. For the Christian those historical facts are to be found in the events connected with Jesus of Nazareth, and especially with His death upon a cross, and His rising again from the dead, and in the Bible, the Sacraments and the Church, through which we have a direct historical relationship with Him, in addition to those immediate assurances of His living presence with us which from time to time add certainty to faith.

It is thus of importance to notice that theology must be theology of something, an account of God and His dealings with man which rests upon some particular occasion in which those dealings have been manifest. Theology in general would be nothing more than philosophy, which is the age-long and very honourable groping of men in the darkness, seeking to understand themselves and the darkness in which they must needs find their way. Theology begins at any point where a light has broken into that darkness. Thus there is no one system of theology, but we can speak properly of Christian theology, Buddhist theology, Confucian theology, and the like. Each system is the appli-

cation to the whole of life of some ultimate vision of the truth of God. These theologies will necessarily differ in many of their details, but it is not of great importance to compare and debate those details. The fundamental issues between them are concerned solely with the truth and completeness of that central vision of God upon which they rest. The remaining questions are consequential, both in theory and in practice, though there may be grave enough matters for consideration in either field. It is indeed very often through its practical consequences that a particular theology comes to be discredited, and Christianity itself can claim no privileges in this respect. The answer is not simply a reform in practice, but a better theology. That religion which shows most vitality in this respect has a higher claim upon man's allegiance than any religion of static and uncompromising self-assurance.

But a flexible and developing theology does not alter the essential facts of which that theology is the interpretation. Such a theology is, indeed, part of the impact of those facts upon this world-order, and if, as Christianity claims, its basis in history is the direct act of God Himself, inasmuch as " God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself," and if that act of God is continued in His Church, seeing that He " hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation," then we may rightly expect to find that theology itself is no dead and static thing, but the living expression of the truth of the living God. And the historical facts are not changed, any more than God Himself is changed, by the changing emphases and the developing insight which we bring to them.

Theology, then, starts from a definite point in history, and proceeds directly from that point to its proper business of " talking sense about God." We can see the process simply enough in the New Testament. As it stands the New Testament is the record of the way in which certain men reacted to the personality and life of Jesus of Nazareth. The effect upon their thinking was startling, but it was also very simple. They did not develop a tragic sense, or try to explain the complex mystery of human life. They passed straight to the fundamental truth about God, " God is love." That climax of New Testament thinking goes back, indeed, to Jesus Himself, who, when He taught His disciples to pray, had taught them to say " Abba, Father," and so as children to enter the Kingdom, which is also

the Father's house. "Then are the children free." This world-order may be evil, ridden by malevolent or ignorant demonic powers, but the life of the Christian "is hid with Christ in God," and Christ has overcome the world. But this, too, is the act of God and so reveals the actual significance of the divine love, for "God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself." Love, then, is active and powerful and creative and "from above." It requires a new word, *agapē*, to avoid confusion when we speak of it, for human love falls far short of these things. But above all it shows God as actively and directly concerned with the affairs of this world, and this was little less than a revolution in human thought, even as it led to a revolution in human lives, for the best philosophy and the deepest piety of the world, East and West alike, had come to dwell more and more upon the gulf between God and man. That man should strive to bridge that gulf, and strive in vain, seemed to most people of the ancient world natural and inevitable. That God Himself should have bridged it, once and for all, was overwhelming news. It was not merely "good tidings"; the Greek word, with its background in the Septuagint, means far more than that. It was revolutionary news, and it compelled a revision of all man's ordinary ways of thought just as it demanded a new standard in all his ordinary ways of living. That revision of thought has been going on ever since the days of Jesus, who taught no philosophy and developed no theology, but whom no philosophy can ignore if it is to be complete as an interpretation of man's life. It is indeed a revolution, but it is a revolution that can be carried out only by those in whose lives the fact of Christ lives and is strong. Christian theology is the task of Christian men. For those who are not Christians it will not be irrational, since its methods are those of man's ordinary rational thinking at its best, but it will necessarily be incomprehensible, since it embodies and rests upon something which is not primarily rational at all, the challenge and claim of God in Christ seeking to reconcile us to Himself.

That is why the study of theology is not merely urgent, but actually exciting, if only it is carried on in the true spirit of Christian discipleship and adventure. For it seeks to carry out the discovery of God, in all its consequences, into every field of thought and practice. And anybody who has even made a beginning of living by the law of love in the

world that we know to-day knows well what an adventure it can be.

This is the full meaning of the scholastic conception of theology as the queen of the sciences, or science of sciences, *scientia scientiarum*, though the medieval schoolmen, with no knowledge of departmentalized science in the modern sense, tended to express this by regarding theology as an all-inclusive system of thought, rather than as a principle which gives significance to every such system, unifying without displacing them. Theology is the science of sciences, because it is a principle of understanding which can be applied to all those various fields of knowledge which form the specialized activities of the human mind.

Thus history, as the study of the actual progress of man's corporate life, has a perfectly clear place of its own as a scientific study. But the significance of those facts cannot be given by the methods strictly appropriate to the historian, and when it comes to the point, different historians, equally accurate in their grasp of historical detail, may be quite wildly diverse in their interpretation of history. Here theology steps in, for it is clearly highly relevant to the understanding of history that God, under whose creative hand all history takes place, should be not only, as the prophets saw, a God of justice but a God of love, satisfying in Himself the utmost demands of His own justice, and thereby redeeming all history, despite its tragedies, to be the vehicle of His love. Even as a matter of secular fact it is recognizably true that the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth was the critical point of human progress and of the development of the higher values in human culture. But the theological interpretation of that fact lies far deeper, and sees in the whole historical process a movement towards the consummation of a divine purpose of love, whether in time or beyond time, of which the Cross is only the temporal and particular expression, supremely significant for us, but significant not so much in itself as in that which it reveals, both of God and of man.

This particular example of the relation of theology to history will serve to make plain a point of much wider application. The proper function of theology in this connexion has shown itself in providing the interpretation of history. This must not be confused with the function of history in relation to theology, which is obviously concerned with the task of recording the various forms of

theology which have arisen and of exhibiting them in some kind of connected sequence. Thus the theology of history is by no means the same thing as the history of theology.

The point would seem too obvious to need making if it were not that in actual fact there is often a great deal of confusion between theology proper, or dogmatics, or Christian doctrine, and the history of doctrine, as may be seen clearly enough by the type of questions set in ordination examinations and other similar tests set to candidates for the ministry. A very brief study of these tests will suffice to show that there is no clear purpose in the minds of the examiners. At times they seem to be requiring simply a standard of historical knowledge. Very much less frequently they are demanding a true theology, and asking the candidates to reveal their thought as well as their memory for facts. Yet the second and not the first of these objects is the main purpose of such an examination. It is what men believe, with the fullest rational grounds for their belief, that counts, and not simply what they may be able to remember.

Theology, then, will have a good many subdivisions of its own, and a good many attendant subjects closely linked with it. These latter, as in the case of the history of doctrine, will be part of the necessary equipment of the theologian, but they are not in themselves theology. Dr Adam, in the article in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* which we have already quoted, takes these two classes of subject-matter together as covered by the term theology in the broadest sense. He is thus able to enumerate no fewer than twenty-three branches of theology, forming the whole range of ancillary studies which find their systematic significance in the supreme study of the philosophy of religion. It is not necessary for our purpose to work through his list. What does concern us now is simply to point out the very wide range of human interests with which theology finds itself involved. That is natural enough, since there can be no human interest and no part of human life which can maintain a separate status and values of its own, apart from the God " in whom we live and move and have our being." If " the proper study of mankind is man," the proper key to that study is always God.

Nobody, therefore, need find theology dull except a person who, contrary to all human nature, is without interests of any kind. For any interest with which man

can occupy himself must ultimately come within the system of God's creative purposes. Even an interest in gardening, or in geology, or in the collecting of souvenirs, must mean something beyond itself if it is not to end in the futility of the gardener who can enjoy gardens no more, of the geologist who can no longer wield his hammer, of the souvenir-hunter whose rooms are filled with objects to which no memories are any longer attached. In these comparatively trivial cases the direct theological issues may seem far to seek. Yet perhaps a man who enjoys his garden as to the glory of God, and uses it for the happiness of his fellow-men, is not far from a true theology of gardening.

The main headings into which theology falls will be in part scientific and historical. These are, as we have said, really ancillary subjects, and will mainly attract those whose minds are trained in enquiries of that kind. The historical and literary and linguistic study of the Bible, the history of the development of doctrine and of organization in the Church, the more directly human type of history which seeks to reconstruct the lives of great heroes of the faith, in short the whole application of scientific method to the origins and development and present state of Christianity, is a part of the necessary task of Christian scholars. The results of their labours will slowly be refined down until what is essential and important becomes available for ordinary folk who have not the leisure or training to become scholars themselves. For this reason there is always need for lightly written and popular books in which the conclusions of the best scholarship are made generally available.

The remaining and the more important task of theology is the direct application of the truth about God contained in the Christian revelation to the business of Christian thinking and living. There will thus be ascetic theology, the title of which sounds formidable, but which actually concerns itself with the most interesting of all subjects, that development of character which every man in fact desires, and with the bearing of the existence of God upon that development. There will be the related science of Christian ethics, passing the judgment of the Christian standard, revealed in Christ, upon the standards of ordinary human life. The necessity and importance of this to-day is shown clearly enough by the intense interest which men show in the rights and wrongs of international equity, of social justice, of pacifism, and the like. There will be

pastoral theology, and Christian sociology, and other similar studies. Finally, there will be the questions arising from these, questions as to the actual nature of this world-order, and, behind this world-order, of God Himself. Thus in doctrine and in the philosophy of religion we reach the final stage of theology, as our finite minds, holding fast to the revelation which they have received, strive to grasp that Infinite which is the source of the revelation, and so to pass beyond that world-order and its problems, and to rest in God Himself.

L. W. GRENSTED.

The Sermons of a Country Parson: James Woodforde in His Pulpit—I.

"I READ Prayers and Preached this morning at Weston." "I read Prayers and Preached this afternoon at Weston." These laconic entries recur frequently throughout the five volumes of *The Diary of a Country Parson*,[1] edited by Mr John Beresford, but unfortunately their pages furnish scarcely any means of penetrating beyond the bare record. The impression produced not improbably upon the reader of the diaries of Parson James Woodforde is rather that of a *bon vivant* than of a pastor devoted to the cure of souls. Doubtless the modern world is more interested in what Woodforde ate than in what he preached; perhaps, too, the bias lay that way in the mind of the diarist himself. But it may be that he regarded the reading of divine service and delivery of the sermon as an accepted duty, which did not call for more than the like desiccated record entered nowadays in an official Register of Services. At least it does not necessarily follow that he discharged only the apparent minimum of clerical duty in a perfunctory manner; and there is reason to suspect that the balance between meats and drinks on the one hand and the preparation of sermons on the other has been imperfectly represented by the space devoted to them respectively in the published extracts from his diaries. It is fortunate that the same family piety which has preserved the domestic diaries has ensured

[1] *The Diary of a Country Parson: The Reverend James Woodforde*, 1758-1802. Edited by John Beresford. 5 vols. 1926-31. Oxford University Press.

the survival of a considerable quantity of his sermons, to the number of forty.[1] They are written in small booklets, in the diarist's firm, clear handwriting (somewhat enlarged, it would appear, in order to make easier reading in church), and their number and variety of subject are sufficient to present a fair testimony both of the character and content of his pastoral preaching.

Perhaps the first item for which a student of eighteenth-century religion looks is a sermon on the text, "And His commandments are not grievous" (1 John v. 3). From this text Archbishop Tillotson had developed the theme of "the precepts of Christianity not grievous"; and text, theme, and words alike were borrowed probably by many obscure rural incumbents, as the case of Anthony Hastwell in his remote parish of the North Riding of Yorkshire suggests. In the case of Parson Woodforde the seeker's curiosity is not unrewarded; for the sermon carefully designated No. 140 presents again text, subject, and, to a very remarkable extent, Tillotson's *ipsissima verba*. The discourse was delivered first in 1769 at Ansford and Castle Cary (where the diarist fulfilled the office of curate), and was repeated there in 1771 and 1773. The congregation at Weston heard it in 1777, and it was preached there again in 1780, 1785, 1789, and 1794. This repetition characterizes most of the two-score surviving discourses, excepting a few written in the 1790's and spoken only twice or perhaps once. It may be observed in passing that the latest sermons are appreciably shorter than the earlier, so that age did not bring prolixity to Woodforde. With sermon 140 a consideration of the characteristics of his teaching may most usefully begin; though in this case, since the theme was taken over ready-made from Tillotson, the examination will indicate chiefly the degree of copying and dependence, and other discourses will illustrate better the individuality of the preacher.

The archbishop's discourse was intended to establish three propositions: "(1) that the laws of God are reasonable, that is, suitable to our nature and advantageous to our interest; (2) that we are not destitute of sufficient power and ability for the performance of them; and (3) that we have the greatest encouragements to this purpose."

Woodforde is content with the first and last points,

[1] I desire to express my grateful thanks to Dr R. E. H. Woodforde of Winscombe, Somerset, for the privilege of reading and quoting from these sermons.

omitting the second; and, leaving aside likewise Tillotson's exordium, he joins his master where the latter embarks upon his demonstration of the first consideration. The argument is that though God might have commanded hard things, in fact He " has not made use of that right," but instead has required nothing, " that is either unsuitable to our reason or prejudicial to our interest, nay, nothing that is severe and against the inclination of our nature, but where the apparent necessity of our interest requires it, or an extraordinary reward is promised to our obedience."

During the first three pages of his discourse, Woodforde follows the very words of Tillotson, omitting only two sentences and changing an expression here and there. The theme is developed by a demonstration that the practice of piety and virtue is conducive both to temporal prosperity and eternal felicity; but the country parson leaves his model by omitting an excursus on " repentance and restitution, mortification of our lusts and passions, humility, patience and contentedness with our condition, and resignation of ourselves to the will of God, forgiving and loving our enemies, and self-denial for the cause of God and religion."

Doubtless a desire for brevity occasioned the departure, but on rejoining the archbishop in the third section of his sermon, where the encouragements to observe God's commandments are considered, Woodforde follows him to the end, though again with considerable abbreviation and omission. The chief encouragements to any course of action are " present pleasure and the assurance of a future reward," both of which are fulfilled in Christianity; for here and now " the most serious and manly pleasures, the most solid and substantial joys are only to be found in the ways of religion and virtue," and religion attaches to them the promise of immortality. " Let us now then put both these together, the pleasures of religion and the rewards of it; and they cannot but appear to be a very great encouragement."

The only apparent exception to the truth of this argument lies in the inevitable pain accompanying the first steps towards a religious life on the part of a man who has hitherto lived in contradiction to its precepts. For him the commandments of God are at first grievous; but soon afford tangible evidence of their present value, and even to him the same amount of diligence and perseverance as were formerly devoted to misdoing or absorption in worldly affairs will bring satisfaction and assurance of reward.

" It is undoubtedly sufficient then to recommend religion to any considerate person that the advantages of it are greater than of any worldly design, and the difficulties of it not greater." Indeed, all that is asked of men by God is a sincere effort to keep His commandments, which are not exacting; " for to use our sincere endeavours is nothing else but to do as much as we can; and if we do that, we are sure of God's grace and assistance." The conclusion, therefore, is easily drawn that all arguments, of pleasure now and profit hereafter, of temporal success and eternal happiness, of a quiet conscience and avoidance of evil, combine to prove that Christianity offers a rich reward in return for a very moderate outlay. " In a word, plain, easy, and safe are the paths of religion, and which will always entertain us with pleasure in the course of our journey, and will crown us with happiness at its end."

In order to realize the degree of dependence of Woodforde on Tillotson, it would be necessary to set out in parallel columns their respective sermons, so far at least as their common portions are concerned. Such a study demonstrates the verbal copying by the country parson of the archbishop's discourse. It is evident that Woodforde had not only read Tillotson's sermon, but possessed a copy from which he wrote his own version, which, apart from omissions and abbreviations, is largely identical in words. Indeed Woodforde *is* Tillotson, shortened for the benefit of rustic congregations, but otherwise faithfully and literally reproduced.

From this detailed examination of sermon No. 140, it may be useful to proceed to a survey of the general themes and ideas informing James Woodforde's pastoral preaching. Generally speaking, the majority of the sermons fall into two categories: one illustrating the extent to which the intellectual and scientific theories of his age had penetrated into the common fund of ideas upon which the country clergyman could draw, and the other indicative of the practical religious instruction, relating to the seasons of the ecclesiastical calendar and to the lives of his flock, given by the pastor during his long clerical career. In the former group, perhaps the most striking characteristic is the extent to which Woodforde's discourses are informed by matters of warm contemporary theological controversy.

Few themes were more favoured in the rationalistic eighteenth century than that of the place of reason in religion. Deistic writers had laboured to remove the

element of the mysterious from Christianity and to reduce all its doctrines to the cold analysis of reason; and even the most orthodox divines did not hesitate in reply to affirm their stout adherence to the principle of the reasonableness of religion and to the duty of testing the claims of revelation at the bar of reason. Many eminent names could be quoted on both sides, but the present concern is to discover the degree of understanding of the controversy on the part of Woodforde. One of his sermons (No. 86) is devoted to this subject, and this again is one of the earlier discourses, preached four times in Somerset, in 1766, 1767, 1769, and 1771; once in Oxfordshire, in 1774; and four times at Weston, in 1778, 1782, 1786, and 1794. Taking as his text the statement concerning St Paul in Acts xviii, 4, "And he reasoned in the synagogues every Sabbath and persuaded the Jews and the Greeks," the preacher observed that the apostle used reasoning in general and that kind of particular reasoning suited to his hearers, so that "we have . . . in the whole course of St Paul's preaching, the authority of that apostle for using our reason in matters of religion." The purpose of his sermon was therefore to consider "what is the use we are to make of our faculties in religious matters, how far we may depend upon their guidance and where they may leave us"—that is, "to examine in what instances it is necessary to make use of our rational faculties in matters of religion, and in what instances we are to lay aside our reason and become implicit in our belief."

For the Christian it was an undoubted truth that God had vouchsafed to reveal Himself to man; so that "we cannot act as men or discharge our duty as such, unless we are allowed to make use of our reason in enquiring into the evidence upon which that revelation is supposed to be built." Two immediate tests of the authenticity of a pretended revelation presented themselves, those of consistency and authority. "We all know that God can reveal nothing that is either inconsistent with His own attributes of wisdom and goodness, or is impossible in itself, or implies a manifest contradiction." But if this first test was satisfied, the enquiry must continue to ask whether in point of fact the revelation had proceeded from God; "and of this a man can be assured no other way than by examining the characters and credentials of those that teach it, and considering whether their integrity and capacity and the powers with which they are endowed, are sufficient to

warrant their pretensions, and able to convince any unprejudiced and impartial enquirer that God sent them."

Typically Woodforde echoed the apologetic of his age in suggesting that the only proof able to sustain the claim of divine origin is the power " to work miracles and alter the course of Nature." Such a power is admittedly possessed by the Creator; and any person sharing in this power is thereby proved to have been commissioned by God. " Therefore we should think ourselves obliged to receive the doctrines of those who come with these powers, provided their doctrines be such as are worthy of the divine nature and such as do not contradict any former revelation which God has given." It was in accordance with the last principle that St Paul reasoned from the Scriptures, in order to demonstrate that his preaching was entirely consistent with Old Testament prophecy. For his present purpose Woodforde relied on the evidence of miracles as proof of divine commission. In another sermon (No. 176), he adduced the further consideration of the moral perfection of Christ, and offered an interesting argument against objectors to this point. " It may perhaps be suspected that He undoubtedly has His faults, though His historians have not been ingenuous enough to relate them. To remove this suspicion, let it be remembered that these historians have recorded their own faults and the faults of one another without any reserve. And though it is not absolutely impossible but that they might be kinder to their Master than to themselves, and consult His honour more than their own; yet considering their artless simplicity, I cannot but think that if they had known any private wickedness they would have mentioned it, either by design or accident; and that therefore this suspicion of secret faults is utterly without foundation." It may be doubted whether all the modern critical apparatus of New Testament study has advanced this branch of the argument very much farther than where Woodforde left it.

From the use of reason to substantiate revelation the preacher passed to an interesting parenthesis on the duty of the pastor towards his flock in this regard. " It is undoubtedly a great part of the ministerial office in their public discourses to endeavour to assist men in these particulars. Not first to blind them, as the manner of some is, and then lead them where they please; but to assist their understandings, to endeavour to enlarge the views of the

ignorant, and give them those helps to know their duty, which otherwise they might not have." But, though the right use of reason was admitted, its abuse must be guarded against in the interest of true religion, and to this second duty Woodforde next turned. The difficulty here lay in the circumstance that men could form no idea of the nature of God without revelation; and consequently, if a revelation were well authenticated, they should be willing to accept it even though its doctrines were beyond the capacity of their reason to perceive. "If He is pleased to reveal things of Himself which we cannot comprehend, our want of comprehension is no just reason why we should reject such a revelation." In particular, the preacher applied this consideration to the work of the Holy Spirit, whose operations should be accepted "by the faithful, though they cannot understand how God operates upon the mind, or conveys His divine influences to the soul." Likewise it was no just objection to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body that we do not know how it will be done. It is as easy for God to raise a body as to make one; and "since almighty God has revealed this doctrine to us, it must be the indispensable duty of all who receive His word to believe it." The conclusion of the matter in practical terms was therefore that belief should be given to all doctrines provable from the Scriptures, which bore their own evidences of divine authority.

Another favourite topic of eighteenth-century theology was the proof of theism from natural science. To an age which witnessed the discovery or popularization of the telescope, the microscope, the barometer, and the thermometer it seemed reasonable to look for confirmation of Christianity in the operations of Nature. Indeed the astronomical theologians and the scientific prelates of the twentieth century would have been even more at home in the eighteenth, when the testimony of creation to its Creator was less equivocal than to-day. The staymaker of Norfolk, Thomas Paine, carried into the market-place the new religion of Nature which was to accord with the political realization of democracy; whilst the pulpit of Weston echoed similar doctrines from the mouth of Woodforde. And not the pulpit of Weston only, for Sermon No. 155, upon the text "All nations before Him are as nothing, and they are counted to Him less than nothing and vanity" (Isaiah xl, 17), was preached in Somerset in 1770 and 1773,

and repeated at Weston in 1778, 1782, 1786, and 1792. It began by a demonstration of the insignificance of all the nations compared with the vastness of Creation; and proceeded, in most modern fashion, to labour the unimportance of the earth amid the myriads of worlds in the universe.

" What are all the nations upon this globe? What this globe itself when compared with the greatness of the works of God in this universe? Nay, what when compared even with this one solar system of ours? But what again is this system, what the sun with all the planets that attend him when compared to the greatness of those works which fall even under our notice? What a little thing is our whole system when considered in this view! So little that were it entirely annihilated, it would be hardly missed. Supposing the fixed stars to be each a centre of such a system, how great the number and how magnificent the frame! But still farther, how little is all which we can comprehend of the works of God, when compared with the immensity of space without any possible limit or bound: I say, how inconsiderable all the works of God, that we know anything of, when compared with this immensity and that Being who fills it!"

From this survey of " the material world . . . the lowest and least significant work of God," the preacher passed to consider the testimony of animate creation. " In a living creature we see more excellency than in any possible mass, however extended, of mere dead matter. But when the mind turns to the contemplation of the world of Life, the thoughts are immediately called off from the brutal creation to the higher orders, who are endowed with intellectual, especially with moral, powers. Of this kind, though in the lowest rank, is the human race, to whom this globe is given for an habitation." Thus kindled, the preacher's imagination proceeded to consider what might be said concerning " all the worlds which God hath made. Are they without life, without inhabitants of the rational and moral kind? No, certainly. How inexpressible the number of them! How great that family of God! Who can number His hosts?" Such was the evidence of creation to its Maker; and, in the most approved modern manner, Woodforde confirmed the faith of his hearers by an appeal to the testimony of the scientists of his own day. " It is pleasing to a good mind to think that this great article of

our faith is established and confirmed by the best and highest improvements which have been made in reason and the knowledge and study of Nature; and that those who have made the greatest progress in their enquiries, ascribe activity only to the mind, as that in which matter hath no share; making it apparent that to speak of the powers of matter and of a necessity under which they are, or a chance by which changes are produced in it, is a language which really has no meaning. God omnipotent reigneth; in His infinite mind the plan of this universe was formed, and by His power the glorious design was carried into execution."

The modern reader may marvel that the understanding and endurance of the rustic hearers of Somerset and Norfolk were fortified to receive such strong meat of doctrine. Nor were such sermons a product only of the preacher's younger days. A comparison of natural religion with revealed formed the theme of Sermon No. 221, preached at Weston in 1784, 1788, and 1792, and reappeared in Sermon No. 197, preached twice during 1783 in Norfolk and again in 1787 and 1795. A commendation of natural religion crept into Woodforde's Good Friday sermon (preached also on Palm Sunday) from the text " I am determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ and Him crucified " (1 Cor. ii, 2). Despite the apparent limitations imposed by such a text, the preacher " allowed that too much cannot well be said of the excellency and use of the precepts of what is called Natural Religion, nor can the necessity of their observance be too often and too warmly inculcated, if considered only in themselves and not as exclusive of other duties. Christianity has established them on the firmest basis; and our modern advocates for the moral system in opposition to or derogation from the divine, must (if they will act consistently with their pretences) retain a great veneration and esteem at least for the Gospel, which has given us the only perfect scheme of moral laws, and bound them upon us by sanctions of infinitely greater force than the reason or authority of man could devise."

Upon one occasion Woodforde brought these principles of natural religion down to the level of his rustic auditors, in Sermon No. 189 upon the text " Stand still and consider the wondrous works of God " (Job xxxvii, 14). Herein he appealed to them as countrymen to perform all their duties in the light of religion. " We are employed perhaps about some or other of His creatures; but how and with

what intentions? Do we regard them as the workmanship of an all-wise and almighty Creator? Observing how exquisitely they are formed, what ends they promote, and to what uses they serve? Do we take due notice of those perfections which are visible to every eye, and obvious to every understanding; how the world is replenished and the Creation adorned; how wisely everything is adapted and how graciously designed?" Therefore agriculture should "be done with a constant and habitual eye to the glory of God, and it easily may, without any inconvenience or disadvantage to our secular designs." He that followed the plough could reflect "what perfect art, what incomprehensible contrivance, appear in the formation and structure of the vegetable world"; and if during the course of his labour he should "lift up his eyes to the heavens what astonishing instances do we find of the Creator's power and perfection, such as every eye may perceive and every understanding contemplate!" Whether the countryman regarded the earth below or the sky above, the seed which he sowed or the cattle which he tended, "every object we meet with, whether great or small, bears the stamp of an all-perfect Creator, is a mark of His wisdom, a monument of His power, and a proof of His goodness; insomuch that it may be difficult for us to determine whether ornament or convenience, use or dignity, has been most regarded."

To the reader of the twentieth century such sermons of James Woodforde, dealing with contemporary problems in the relations of science and religion, may well seem either a reflection upon his own modernity or an illustration of the aphorism that there is nothing new under the sun. But though a modern hearer might reply with a vigorous negative to the implied question *Should such a faith offend?*, he would be justified in wondering how far the diarist's preoccupation with these exalted themes was profitable or edifying to his auditors. These sermons reflect indeed an unexpected sensitiveness of Woodforde to eighteenth-century theological controversies. For an appreciation of his attitude towards the cardinal doctrines of Christianity, the lessons of the ecclesiastical seasons, and the practical duties of Christian profession, attention must be turned to the pastoral sermons, which require separate consideration and treatment.

N. Sykes.

Culture and Conversion

(" A fairy-tale, General, is significant according to the number of people who believe in it."—*The Ascent of F6*. By W. H. Auden.)

Mr Middleton Murry thinks that it is easier to go to church in the country than in the town because it is a more natural activity—the underlying pattern of things is still discernible in the village, and it is a religious pattern.[1] A reviewer in the *Times Literary Supplement*, discussing Mr Michael Roberts's book on *T. E. Hulme*, is perplexed because the application of a criterion of belief in original sin would seem to class such different people as Hulme and Franz Kafka as " Christians." Mr Geoffrey West, in a review of the same book in *Time and Tide* (July 9, 1938), is bothered by Mr Roberts's remark that, if an authority beyond one's own self is once accepted, " it is difficult to see how, for a Western European, the authority could be other than that of the Christian Church." But how, Mr West asks, can any authority be selected, and " how distinguished from competing ' false ' authorities, save by individual subjective human judgment and, finally, intuition " ? Mr Christopher Dawson has impressed many an unbeliever by his clear exposure of the need of contemporary civilization for a unifying faith, and the specifically religious origin of its cultural decline. But Mr H. B. Parkes, in an interesting essay on Dawson,[2] dissents from his positive conclusions: we may agree, he says, that our civilization has shown itself to be in need of some kind of unifying religion, " but the argument that we should adopt Catholicism because it is the only religion obviously available is hardly likely to inspire us with true religious fervour, just as the attempts of Augustus to restore the old Roman faith failed to avert the decline of Rome." There is, he maintains, a hiatus in the chain of Dawson's reasoning which makes it legitimate to evade the final issue of conversion to the Church; and in a later number of *Scrutiny* (September, 1937) he replies to a criticism in *Arena*[3] thus: " *Arena* complains that I evade discussion of any of the specific arguments for the truth of

[1] *God or the Nation* (pamphlet published by the Peace Pledge Union, 1938). [2] In *Scrutiny*, March, 1937. [3] A Roman Catholic periodical with political, philosophical and literary interests, whose recent demise is much to be regretted.

Christianity; but since Dawson, in his writings, scarcely discusses them, it would be irrelevant for me to do so. Dawson himself believes that Christianity is true: but the main argument of his writings is merely that a religion is culturally necessary."

There is the problem clearly stated, a problem which may be *the* problem of our time. When we have proved that the cultural decline of the West in the last two or three centuries is historically connected with the break-up of a unity based on a supernatural faith, *how much* have we proved? Does it logically and inevitably lead on to the next step, that only with a return to that faith will come a real cultural sanity and integration? The Christian will say "Yes"; the agnostic will say "No." Either or both of these may be answering according to their preconceptions. As Mr Parkes says, the cultural historian is driven to adopt a Spenglerian relativism, and from this relativism the Christian does not escape; "the only possible method of evaluating a culture would be to consider how far it satisfied the needs of human beings, but unfortunately our definition of human needs is itself determined by the culture to which we happen to belong." What hope is there that the supporter of either side can jump clear of this stream of relativism and see truth as it is?

The first observation that may be made is the rather obvious one that there is clearly no immediate solution to the whole problem. It is not so apparent that the Church has preserved, we will not say values, but a cultural standard which the world outside has lost, that one could conclude that wholesale conversion to the Church would *per se* restore a forgotten balance. Indeed, Mr Martin Turnell, late editor of *Arena*, writing as a Roman Catholic, warns us against so facile a conclusion;[1] the Catholic, he says, is just as liable to critical error because of his faith as the unbeliever because of his lack of it. "Theory perverts sensibility. As an example, we have the Marxist critic's enthusiasm for Shelley on account of his alleged 'revolutionary' outlook, and the admiration of Catholics for a poet like Francis Thompson. . . . Francis Thompson's *Hound of Heaven* may, as a distinguished preacher once argued, be an excellent 'retreat book,' but the soundness of its theology or the 'majesty' of its central idea does not

[1] *Poetry and Crisis* (published by Sands, 1938).

concern the critic. What does concern him is that the language of the poem is tired, stale, effete." Perhaps Mr Turnell does not entirely escape this condemnation himself, for he ranks G. M. Hopkins as a " major poet," which is disputable; and even if the classification be allowed, it must be emphasized that Hopkins's importance is far more as a poet of a new language and idiom than as a specifically Christian poet. It is, of course, of singular significance that Hopkins could write living poetry as a Jesuit; just as it is of importance to notice that Mr Eliot's touch has not undergone any weakening or loosening since his conversion. But this is not sufficient to disprove the indisputable fact that the Church herself has been infected by the disintegration outside; Samson, pulling down the pillars to crush his enemies, brings down the roof on his own head. If Mr Eliot is right in claiming " secularism " to be the chief corruption of modern literature,[1] then it is a corruption from which the Church herself has not been immune; and *corruptio optimi pessima.* It is clear that a closer analysis of the situation is called for.

But to analyse the present means also to explore the past. First, it is pertinent to ask what we require of a Christian poet. The question is important because of much current misunderstanding: and misunderstanding of what is required leads to misunderstanding of what can be done. As an example we shall take some false statements of the position with regard to Shakespeare. In a recent book[2] Messrs Kenneth Muir and Sean O'Loughlin conclude their study of Shakespeare by seeing in the last plays a final triumphant arrival at a Christian position " by the process of his own natural development," thrashed out after much struggle in the abyss of the tragedies, from which " there emerges a system that is manifestly Christian, and this is all the more impressive since it appears to have been built up on poetic rather than theological foundations." In particular there is *The Tempest*, which is " uncoloured by dogma. . . . The main ideas contained in it, of an overruling Providence, of forgiveness, of the transcending of righteousness and judgment, and the passing beyond good and evil, of the supreme importance of love and immortality, all these are the central teaching of Christ." The brief answer to this

[1] " Religion and Literature," in *Faith That Illuminates* (reprinted in *Essays Ancient and Modern*). [2] *Voyage to Illyria* (1937).

misrepresentation of the problem, with its anachronistic insulation of "theology" and "dogma," is to point out that Liberal Protestantism was not yet born. A reviewer in the *York Quarterly*[1] sees this—"the teaching of Christ," he retorts, "is not Christianity." But he goes on to commit a precisely similar error in the opposite direction. "It is clear that Messrs Muir and O'Loughlin do not find in Shakespeare any conviction that he had been saved by Christ's death and justified by His resurrection. The evidence of the plays is that at no time was Shakespeare's attitude to Christianity anything more than objective and external." The answer to this is that Shakespeare was not a Puritan either, with a mission to describe in poetry his pilgrim's progress to solifidianism. Moreover, to say that Shakespeare's attitude to Christianity was always "external" is to beg various questions and to conclude him a sectary (for which there is no evidence); while an "objective" attitude to Christianity means little at this stage in history. The point is that we must not demand an apologia from every Christian poet, and only in specifically devotional poetry (medieval lyrics, St John of the Cross, Crashaw, Keble, etc.) should the Christianity be explicit. "Does a Christian novel mean a novel with a happy ending?" I have heard one ask. No. Nor is every Christian poem a theodicy. The poet's beliefs are not the fruit of his orchard, not even the manure; they are in the soil which produces and in the appetite which consumes, they are merely the ultimate justification for having an orchard at all. And therefore they are not simply an individual *position* arrived at, even though in certain historical circumstances the poet may be driven to make a choice of an individual position; they are the pattern of thought and life which becomes stronger and more binding the more it can be first accepted and then simply assumed. Here is no mere mascot for the poet; this leek is not to be worn in our hats but to be swallowed and digested, to work in the blood without our knowledge.

We have considered the case of the Christian poet. Mr Martin Turnell, indeed, in the book already cited, is chiefly concerned with the attitude of the Church to modern culture. Does this, we must now ask, give us an analogy for what should be the attitude of the littérateur to the Church?

[1] Jan., 1938.

That is to say, to put the question simply: can the Christian reader enter into non-Christian poetry; and if so, is the reverse true, that the non-Christian reader can similarly enter into Christian poetry? Is there possible a parallel suspension of unbelief on both sides? Mr Turnell thinks that the Christian is in the happier position, because in the rationalist's case there is a positive belief to be disposed of, " in our own, simply an absence of belief. . . . The work of an unbeliever . . . does not present a picture of the universe which we as Catholics must reject. It is not bound up with dogmatic atheism. It simply presents a series of moods which are largely unrelated and into which Catholics can enter like anyone else." That is true so far as it goes, but it leaves out of account an intermediary factor which is of importance for the problem we have set ourselves in this essay; the positive " diabolic influence " in modern literature. We have, that is to say, not merely to deal with two clear-cut divisions, the Christian and the non-Christian; we have a great many, extending from the Christian through the normal secularist to the atheist and finally to the blasphemous. And it is because the extremes meet that we can agree with Mr Eliot that such writers as Baudelaire, Villon and Joyce may be classed as " Christian." In those who can blaspheme there is at any rate recognition of what is worth the dignity of blasphemy, and that implies a grasp of those values that our civilization is in danger of losing. Therefore we can say that for those who cannot blaspheme conversion is their only hope, even for their sensibility, much more for their souls. While the conclusion seems to be forced on us that from the cultural point of view those who can blaspheme have learnt as much as we can teach them; literary criticism, at any rate, cannot conduct them to worship.

Literary criticism cannot, because that is not its function. But there is still the individual's problem to be solved (and solved by appeal to other criteria), for it is doubtful whether any man can rest long in blasphemy, drawing vitality all the time from that at which he spits. So that the problem, if evaded—as it rightly may be—on one ground, will only turn up the more insistently on another. At this point where literary criticism shades into apologetic we too must retire, for the most that literary criticism can do from the point of view of this essay is to indicate the place where apologetic ought to start. And that place is the point at

which a myth becomes a suitor for faith. Mr D. G. James, in a recent book of great interest,[1] sees that this may be so—must be so in the case of Christianity, which is, as he says, " compelled to assert the reality of its mythos." And yet Mr James draws the line too hard. " The difference, therefore, between Wordsworth, on the one hand, and Keats and Shakespeare on the other, is this: that Keats and Shakespeare endeavoured themselves to create a mythology and failed in the task, while Wordsworth, accepting Christian dogma, was not under the necessity to attempt the task to which the other poets had addressed themselves." But what is true of Christianity is true to a lesser degree of any mythology: no man, and not even a whole civilization, can " create " a mythology; only an eccentric could set out deliberately to " believe eight impossible things before breakfast." Even Mr Yeats, delving into Celtic mythology, found *something there*; and Professor Hauer cannot hope to hold his disciples long to his Nordic faith if his tongue is in his cheek. Cannot hope to hold them long—and it is the long run that counts, which must be our final answer to the problem we have here indicated. For it is just here that the adversary stutters and changes the subject. " Mr Dawson," says Mr H. B. Parkes in the article already quoted, " is concerned with the philosophical level. On this level, however, changes are both slow and deep, so that the power of an individual to influence them is small, and problems are never urgent. . . . It is only on the level of practical activity that problems are urgent." That is an abdication of the real issue which could be possible only to one whose thinking has been corroded by pragmatism. And between such thinking and the view *sub specie æternitatis* there can be no compromise. Whether the evasion of the specific issue of the Church makes for freedom, or in the end for restriction (as Mr Michael Roberts hints in the case of T. E. Hulme: see the book on Hulme referred to above), is not here to be decided. What can clearly be seen by either side is that concern with " the philosophical level," the belief that *magna est veritas et prævalebit*, implies a teleological faith, a faith in something that over-arches history and yet acts through history. We have sighed, in thinking of the Church's infection by the contagious diseases outside, that Samson should have been involved in the ruin

[1] *Scepticism and Poetry* (1937).

he made. But we have forgotten the point of the story, that Israel thereby survived. And therefore

> I say to you: *Make perfect your will.*
> I say: take no thought of the harvest,
> But only of proper sowing.
>
> T. S. Eliot, *The Rock.*

Or, as an older poet has it, translating an older philosopher, "Yif thow castest thi seedes in feeldes, thou wholdest han in mynde that the yeres ben amonges outher-while plentevous and outher-while bareyne. Thou hast by-taken thi-self to the governance of Fortune and for-thi it byhoveth the to ben obeisaunt to the maneris of thi lady."[1]

W. R. Jarrett-Kerr.

The Problem of Luxury: Renunciation or Consecration

"The liberty of spending, or necessity of parsimony, may be varied without end by different circumstances." The fact that these words of Dr Johnson's are true does not mitigate the unrest which grows as each post brings its new appeal. If we are not ourselves in actual want we need something to soften the perplexity produced by the knowledge of so much need, and we consider our expenditure and wonder which part of it should be labelled luxurious. In last month's Theology, disturbed by this inner unquiet, I tried to analyse the idea of luxury with reference to the two categories of need and use. That of need (whether my own or another's) did not take me very far; but the notion of use, although bafflingly complex in its detailed application, seemed more promising, in that it kept my thought more closely in touch with the idea of a *community* of persons in mutual rapport. Community itself is far from being a simple idea, but the aspect of community relevant to my purpose is that which finds expression in the answer given to the question, "How does my manner of life affect my neighbour, and how should it?" For this is a wide form

[1] Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*. Translated by Chaucer, Book II, prosa i.

of the question, " Am I spending so as to make the best type of society ?" It is a fact that expenditure conditions society: demand determines what is produced and how it is produced, and the total of our several insignificant consumptions is what fashions the pattern of the community. Needless to say, though the intention to spend in the best way is an essential first step, it is no substitute for the hard work of discovering what is the best way. We have seen, when we were thinking of the idea of use, how difficult it is to reach any definite conclusions: but some more light is available if we consider what, in fact, helps us to decide our expenditure, or what helps us to form a judgment on the expenditure of others.

Some Factors governing Expenditure

Baudrillart in the first volume of his enormous *Histoire du Luxe* makes the primary point when he talks of " *le superflu, chose très nécessaire.*" Within broad limits it is true to say that the potential ethical importance of a margin is far greater than that of the major part of a man's income. Subject, of course, to the determining factor of social stratification, there is little choice about how a man spends the greater part of his income. The fact of social stratification may itself be ethically undesirable: I shall have more to say of this soon—but given that fact, it is with reference to the margin that most of a man's choice and planning are concerned. Nevertheless, within the conventional and relatively fixed there is room for choice, and the social worth of conformity is not easy to evaluate.

The combination of factors influencing our decision on expenditure includes the social pressure in the direction of conformity to what is " done," the desire for comfort, and the individual's ideal for himself. In a sense this last transcends the others, for a man's ideal for himself will include not only an attitude towards the rightness of comfort, but also a judgment about that side of his duty towards others (as part of his ideal for himself) which is included in the question of conformity. In view of what I have already said, I shall confine my comments to the two points of *comfort* and *social stratification.*

I am not going to be so rash as to suppose that in part of one short article I can hope to discuss and dispose of hedonism. But it is important not to shirk difficulties.

It seems to be altogether foolish to exclude *comfort* from the category of goods which have moral worth on the ground that it is impossible to draw any clear dividing line. Thus Davidson remarks that " the progress of civilization means the devotion of an increasing proportion of the energy of society to non-material ends: and while we regard such ends as valuable, we cannot accept the definition of luxury as unproductive consumption "; and Cunningham in *The Use and Abuse of Money* argues that " material progress is a good thing, because it gives opportunities for intellectual and artistic culture." But here, as everywhere else, the problem of the limit presses. Nicholson in Volume III of *Principles of Political Economy* says that " a shilling to the man who is fasting would mean more happiness than to the man that is full," and Urwick in *Luxury and Waste of Life* lifts the idea out of the context of simple happiness when he writes: " Somewhere in the expenditure of many of us a point is reached beyond which the satisfaction of wants resulting from the spending of our money is rather trifling by comparison with the satisfaction which might be obtained by the use of the same amount of money by someone much poorer than ourselves." Most of us would agree that there is a limit somewhere, and that the greater part of the art of living consists in finding it: but Wesley, if I understand him rightly, argues that there is no question of the limit being anywhere but at the line of the sternest asceticism. In Sermon 113 he says that a rich man is " anyone that possesses more than the necessaries and conveniences of life," and apparently goes on to argue that Matt. xix, 24 means that it is impossible for a rich man to be a Christian. In Sermon 53, where he speaks of gaining, saving, and giving all we can, he says, " Expend no part of it merely to gratify the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eye or the pride of life," and " Waste no part of it in curiously adorning your houses, in superfluous or expensive furniture, in costly pictures, painting, gilding, books "; while in Sermon 92 he states that " seeking happiness in learning of whatever kind falls under the desire of the eye, whether it be in history, language, poetry, or any branch of natural or experimental philosophy." I may be misinterpreting Wesley in thus isolating quotations from the few sermons I have read: but at present I find myself in disagreement with what I judge to be his meaning, for it appears to me to be self-evident that, while in particular

cases asceticism is the right behaviour, in general the world would be morally impoverished if an ascetic discipline were universal.

When we pass from the consideration of comfort to the consideration of *social stratification* we do well to remind ourselves at the outset that we must be realists. Whether we like it or not, this stratification is a fact; and if at the end of our consideration of any proposed consumption we decide that stratification is in essence wrong, a further factor influencing our present action will always be the amount of nonconformity which is most likely to achieve the desired end. To talk of social stratification is really the same thing as talking of a complicated society: and the easiest way of putting the question to ourselves is to ask whether we judge a complicated society to be a good thing. And since this seems to me to be pretty much the same as asking, "Is the evolutionary process a good thing?" I shall not let myself be led astray into a highly abstract calculus, but shall keep to the more practical issues. Such authorities as I have been able to consult on this point seem to agree in a general approval of stratification. Sidgwick happily illustrates the simple life by a Persian story of a king who was told that only the shirt of a perfectly happy man could cure him of his illness. The court was searched, the city, the landowners, the farmers—all had their sorrows and anxieties. At last they met a singing labourer: they proved him with minute enquiries, but no flaw in his happiness was revealed. The remedy seemed in their hands: but alas! the happy man wore no shirt. But after this illustration Sidgwick goes on to urge that on his fundamental principles of ethical judgment (and in assessing these we do well to take into account the last few pages of *The Methods of Ethics*) complexity is a good. And this judgment would seem to override the qualification implied in his *Political Economy*, where he writes of the waste involved in customary expenditure, even of the respectable rich.

Devas in *Political Economy* argues that inequality may be justified on four main grounds: (1) that without the motive of riches progress in industry would be slow; (2) that serious study requires leisure, therefore servants, therefore an upper class; (3) that political growth requires a social hierarchy; and (4) that many virtues require inequality for their existence. The second seems to me the only argument worth considering further, especially in view of the

fact that Taussig in Volume II of his *Principles of Economics* shows how stratification, by giving class-value to educational institutions, tends to maintain the education they provide, *and* how the expense of the education thus maintained in its turn serves to maintain stratification. And if we extend the idea of education to include the production not only of intellectual but also of æsthetic values in a setting making for the growth of a moral personality, it seems clear, for reasons which we have touched on earlier in these articles, that stratification of some kind in principle is right, though, like everything else, open to abuse. It is a pressing personal ethical problem for anyone living in the comfort of a university. Are we abusing the good which undoubtedly lies in our cloistered specialization? How far does "the refinement and complication" of our society make us unfit for work? And for myself I find that there is no principle which by itself effectively blocks softness and laziness. The ethical quality of consumption is closely bound up with a complex context, and, to take a trivial example, while I can justify to myself the consumption of a hot drink at 11 p.m., I cannot normally justify an identical consumption at 11 a.m.

Tests of Consumption

I shall bring this very indefinite section to an end by quoting two tests of consumption, which seem to me to lead up to such conclusions as these articles can hope to reach. Wesley in Sermon 53, which I have already quoted, says: "If any doubt should arise in your mind concerning what you are going to expend either on yourself or on any part of your family, you have an easy way to remove it. Calmly and seriously enquire: (1) In expending this am I acting . . . as a steward of my Lord's goods? (2) Am I doing this in obedience to His Word? (3) Can I offer up this expense as a sacrifice to God through Jesus Christ? (4) Have I reason to believe that for this very work I shall have a reward at the resurrection of the just?" And Richmond, while agreeing, I think, with the principles behind these questions, shows that the removal of doubt is not altogether easy, when in *Economic Morals* he writes: "All consumption is only indirectly productive or helpful, in so far as it enables *us* to do our work or help our fellows the better. This may seem rather a stern test by which to try that purchase of a picture or a book, or that holiday in Switzerland or

the Lakes, or even that pound of tobacco; but I confess I see no way to escape from this test. . . ." And in *Christian Economics* he amplifies this as follows: " The test by which every man has to try his own consumption of wealth, is the question whether it makes him a more useful, a more helpful person. . . . We must take life in its highest and fullest meaning as that which consumption has to feed. Life includes enjoyment and leisure as well as work. . . . It will remain a severe test by which to try our expenditure on personal pleasure, to set against the services they enable us to render with a brighter mind and a more vigorous will, the good which might otherwise have been done by a different use of the same sources."

And writing as I do, when the misery of Europe's fugitives makes need manifest as perhaps never before, I find myself with these tests before my mind, and their insistent positing of questions: " Is there a real common good in my private enjoyment of beauty?" " When I might live in a smaller house and garden, is there a real common good in my living in a larger?" " What is the relation of health and efficiency to enjoyment, and ought I to learn to enjoy a less expensive holiday, and so make it equally health-giving?" and " Is there anything more than convenience in the fitness of clothes to one's work?" It may be said that these are everyone's ordinary perplexities; and in truth they are. But they are none the less pressing, unless one holds with the Roman communion that the abandonment of all private wealth is the Christian's highest way.

Up to this point specifically Christian considerations, though present, have not taken a major place in this discussion. I have attempted to discover and to consider the ideas which seemed to be involved in the concept of luxury, and the result has been a strange and barbarous mixture of economics and politics and ethics. Early in the former article I distinguished for purposes of convenience three main ways of answering the perplexing question which confronts the reflective mind at every act of consumption. I said then that my search began with the hope that I might find some kind of convenient yardstick which would form a labour-saving test of any expenditure. Now I am able to laugh at myself for having had that hope; as also to be penitent, for its disappointment has shown me a little more of the inadequacy in my conception of the Christian Gospel.

Conscience, Principle and Guidance

In concluding this second article I shall think of the two remaining ways on to which the Christian is thrown back in his perplexity—namely, the principles of Jesus, and the present intuitions of conscience. More and more am I seeing that in this, as in every other ethical question, while nothing can ever exclude the primary obligation to think out all the factors involved in a given situation, in the end there will always be present, as the decisive moment in consciousness, an apparently irrational intuition which issues in the conviction that such and such a course is reasonable and right, though a gap in the argument may preclude its formal justification. It is upon this basis that I stand, and to avoid misunderstanding I desire to reassert the importance I attach to the primary obligation of hard thinking as the condition of expecting that there shall be any moral worth in the ultimate intuition which is the spring of the consequent action.

It is impossible, I think, satisfactorily to make a clear-cut division between these two remaining ways, and I shall not attempt it. Nor shall I do more than very briefly indicate the main principles implied in the teaching of Jesus on this matter. In a volume edited by Bishop Gore, called *Property: Its Duties and Rights*, these are summarized thus: (1) Detachment from all material wealth; (2) love for one's neighbour; (3) stewardship; and (4) wealth to be used to ministering to God through Christ in others. But I found a certain inadequacy in this summary, and so I read the gospels again with this one aim in view—to discover what seemed to be the principles of Jesus, or what the early Christian communities regarded as being implied in the principles of Jesus, in regard to property and consumption. And I summarize my conclusions thus:

1. Nothing must stand in the way of the true life of the self. Mark viii, 34 and parallels, Matt. vi, 25 and parallel.

2. This life is ultimately other-worldly. Matt. vi, 19 and parallel.

3. Discipleship involves complete obedience at all times. Mark x, 21 *ff.* and parallels.

(These three propositions are not, of course, peculiar to the problem of consumption. They are the essential prolegomena to any attempt to summarize the principles of Jesus in regard to any moral issue.)

4. Relatively private property is allowable and has its responsibilities. Matt. xx, 15; xxv, 14 *ff.* and parallel.

5. In particular, disciples must be ready to give to the needy. Matt. v, 40 and parallel; Luke xvi, 19 *ff.* (But watch Mark xiv, 3 *ff.* and parallel.)

6. Riches are dangerous but not bad. Mark x, 23 and parallels; Luke vi, 20, 24; xii, 13 *ff.*, 48b.

7. On certain occasions and for certain people real hardship is necessary. Mark vi, 8 and parallels; Luke x, 4.

8. No commercial value but real cost determines the worth of giving, Mark xii, 43 and parallel; and ostentation destroys all worth, Matt. vi, 2; as does hope of reward, Luke xiv, 12.

9. Consumption can have a sacramental character. Mark xiv, 6 and parallel; Matt. xi, 19 and parallel; Luke xv, 23.

I do not suggest either that the references I have quoted are exhaustive or that there is anything new in this statement. I believe it to be accurate; and a consideration of these principles suggests the generalization that in them all the dominant emphasis is *not on the need of the other party, but on the use or motive of the agent.* And although it reveals my stupidity, it is, I think, not without its point that I should repeat what I hinted at early in the former article, that it was not until I had laboriously rejected the idea of need as impossibly clumsy that I reverted to the idea of use. And the significance of this transition seems to me to lie in the fact that only in the idea of use is the primacy of personal choice and personal obedience adequately recognized. I can conceive a machine which should supply another's need—at least a great part of another's need; but no machine has place within the category of use.

But the Christian moralist, who is also a Christian faced with his own personal perplexities and decisions, would never think of resting content with any statement of the principles of Jesus however accurate they were, and however much they were recognized by critics as being indubitably His. No imitation of Jesus will solve our problems; and it is equally a commonplace to remark that the greatest possible readiness to obey, *in itself*, is no quick or certain solution of the application of the principle to concrete situations. Such readiness is, of course, of primary importance, but unless there be the possibility of divine direction, no amount of readiness will apply the universal to the particular. In other words, the problem of luxury, like every other practical

problem, resolves itself into part of the wider problem of the divine ordering of the world. The Christian professes his belief in the Lord Paraclete, and can claim that in small matters as well as in great, for him, in his particular present situation, there is available direction adequate to his needs, given his readiness to obey what he is convinced is such direction. This is not the place for any discussion of the nature of religious experience, or of the need for the clarifying of the concepts of time and of causality; but the vagueness inevitable in any statement of the kind of direction a Christian is justified in expecting points clearly to the dangers of irrationalism. That there is an alogical element at the centre of what we think of as religious experience is clear; that this is what we should expect is almost as clear; but this recognition of its presence opens the door to every kind of irrational and absurd claim to specific illumination, and imposes the necessity of maintaining the right and the duty of the mind to check, up to the limit of its province, the particular intuitions by reference to the principles which command the assent of our reason. The problem resolves itself into that of having the insight and the courage to recognize when " reality is richer than thought," but only thought can minister to that insight and courage, or facilitate the recognition. But since our main concern has been to do the groundwork of the thinking necessary before the obedient Christian can expect to be guided, the more general question of how any guidance is mediated falls outside the scope of this discussion.

The Consecration of Consumption

I will end by summarizing what I have tried to say in these two articles. After discussing the basic meaning of the word " luxury " I enquired whether there was any likelihood of there being principles available to establish the presence of luxury, and hinted at the conclusion of the whole matter when I suggested that there was not. Taking up, however, the idea of excess, I considered the question first from the point of view of need, and by describing the views of some economists on necessities and luxuries I showed the obvious fact—that the calculus of need was impracticably complex. Passing to the idea of use, I urged the relativity of the concept, and then stated with the minimum of discussion four principles which seemed to govern right consumption. After

a brief consideration of the idea of trusteeship in its widest form, I varied the issue by suggesting that advantage was to be gained by asking, "How does my manner of life affect my neighbour?" and in that connexion examined the place of comfort and the fact of social stratification. After summing up this general discussion by quoting some tests of the rightness of consumption, I made an attempt to state the principles of Jesus in regard to the use of wealth, and to show how there is need for Christian thought-directed intuition if there is to be conviction in the application of these principles to particular cases. Nothing striking has come out of my study of this subject—that is probably due as much to my incompetence for the synthesis it demanded as to anything else; but certain general convictions have gradually shaped themselves in my mind, and with their shaping has gone that piecemeal discontent with which I began. For the big effect on me has been to make me think in terms of my use of what is within my control, and with the shift from others' need to my opportunity, the inwardness of the challenge of Christian living has come home to me.

It seems, then, (1) that there is no satisfactory way out so long as things are as they are—"there's no discharge in the war"—and that the pressure of conscience in this matter is part of the cost of trying to be a Christian in an evolving and sinful world; (2) that, as Sidgwick says, "a society from which luxury was effectually excluded would be lazier [and poorer] than a society which admitted it"; (3) that much expenditure when considered by itself and in terms of units appears unjustified, but that when it is considered collectively and in a context it is right, as being part of a social order which has positive value; and (4) that "we are compelled to leave it to the individual conscience . . . to decide how far each is justified in exceeding the average expenditure of the community." The test is not "ought I to do without this?", "must I renounce this consumption?" but "how can I offer this to God?", "is it such that He will consecrate it?"

H. C. L. Heywood.

The Church Assembly

It is impossible to make any adequate survey of the Church Assembly and its work without a brief consideration of the historic causes which brought it into existence. These

may be summarized under four headings. (1) The development of Church life in the nineteenth century had created a new series of administrative problems with which there was no machinery to deal. For example, the transition from the stage when the clergy were drawn from the moneyed classes, and parochial expenses borne by a handful of wealthy people and Church collections even were almost unknown, to a stage when few of the clergy have private means and the general finance of the Church is derived in increasing measure from the artisan population necessitated a complete reconstruction of Church administration. (2) Many of the changes thus necessitated required legislative sanction; but Parliament was more and more preoccupied with other matters, and it was difficult, if not impossible, to find time for ecclesiastical legislation. (3) The Oxford Movement was not originally concerned with sacramental teaching or the externals of worship, though it has led to great changes in these respects throughout the whole Church of England; but primarily it was an assertion of the spiritual independence of the Church—" the fundamental conception of the Church as a self-governing society, ready and able to co-operate with the civil power, but maintaining its independent existence, and rejecting the notion that it is in any sense a mere ' organ of the State ' " (Church and State Report, 1916). (4) The necessary insistence by the Church on the importance of ministerial priesthood led for a time to a depreciation of the place of the laity in Church life; but the latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed a gradual reaction from this view to the truth of the priesthood of the laity, and this could only lead to a demand for a larger share being given to the laity in the management of Church affairs.

These movements led to the creation of the old Representative Church Council, which associated a House of Laity with the Houses of Bishops and Clergy; but this body had no legal powers. In 1913 the Council passed with one dissentient a resolution requesting the Archbishops to appoint a committee " to inquire what changes are advisable in order to secure in the relations of Church and State a fuller expression of the spiritual independence of the Church as well as of the national recognition of religion." A strong committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Selborne; and the eventual creation of the Church Assembly was a direct result of the committee's report

published in 1916. The actual creation of the National Assembly of the Church of England (to give it its full title) was the work of the Convocations of Canterbury and York. It is important to emphasize this, as it has been frequently stated in recent years that the Assembly was created by Parliament. In May, 1919, the Convocations of Canterbury and York presented addresses to the Crown requesting that certain powers respecting legislation should be conferred upon the Assembly. This led to the passing of the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, commonly called the Enabling Act. Under this Act measures passed by the Assembly are submitted for parliamentary approval; they are not subject to parliamentary amendment, but upon a resolution of assent by each House of Parliament they are presented for the Royal Assent and then have the same legal force as ordinary Acts of Parliament. It is thus clear that the Church brought the Assembly into existence and obtained parliamentary recognition for it in order to facilitate legislative reforms which were necessary for the well-being of the Church, to associate the laity with the clergy in the management of Church affairs (subject, of course, to the due recognition of the special functions of the ordained ministry), to create an organ through which the general mind of the corporate body of the Church could "formulate its judgment by resolution upon any matter concerning the Church of England or otherwise of religious or public interest," and to ensure a greater degree of spiritual freedom for the Church. Any attempt to pass judgment on what the Assembly has accomplished must start from the recognition of these aims.

In regard to the first of these aims—administrative reforms—the achievements of the Assembly are very considerable. Five new dioceses have been created, and though there are some critics of the policy of creating smaller dioceses very few of those who live in the new dioceses would wish to go back to the old arrangement. The law in regard to dilapidations on parsonage houses and other glebe property has been thoroughly overhauled; here too there are critics, but no one with a full knowledge of the facts can doubt that the new system is immensely more businesslike and more beneficial to the clergy than that which it replaced. A system of pensions for the clergy has been introduced, and more recently a scheme for pensions for their widows and dependents. Admittedly these are still very inadequate,

but they are steps in the right direction; and it is a great gain if there are far fewer clergy who are crippled financially by having to pay out a portion of their income as pensions to their predecessors. The scandal of the sale of advowsons, by which it was possible for the right to present to a spiritual charge to be regarded as a piece of property for sale, has been abolished. The Revised Lectionary has been authorized and has led to a better understanding of the spiritual value of the Bible in a large number of parishes. Provision has been made for the union of benefices in cases where there was insufficient work (and often insufficient money) for an incumbent; this has had the indirect result of setting free a number of clergy to work in areas which were badly understaffed. The Indian Church has been given self-government. The Missionary Council of the Church Assembly has done much to further co-operation between the different missionary societies and to educate the home Church in regard to work overseas. In particular the issue year by year of the unified statements of the work and needs of the Church overseas has been of immense value to all workers in the missionary cause. Fuller recognition has been given to the responsibility of the whole Church for such aspects of its work as the training of the clergy, the training of Christian teachers, moral welfare work, and work among the deaf and dumb. It would not be difficult for a critic to point out many defects in all these legislative and administrative achievements of the Assembly, and no doubt there is much more to be done; but the Church may rightly be proud of what has been accomplished.

The attempt to associate the laity with the clergy in the general management of Church affairs has not been confined to the Assembly itself. The Church and State Report of 1916 recommended the creation in every parish of a parochial church council with statutory powers; and one of the first acts of the Assembly was the passing of a measure in 1921 to carry out this recommendation. There is still a considerable diversity of opinion as to the value of parochial church councils. In some parishes, especially in the country, the lay members of the councils seem to have developed little initiative, and it cannot be said that they have yet proved a strength in Church life. In other parishes incumbents have found them a hindrance rather than a help; we may hope that these parishes are few, and the fault may not always lie with the laity. In a good many parishes church

councils have taken up their responsibilities with real enthusiasm, have relieved the clergy of a good deal of financial and administrative work, and have associated themselves wholeheartedly with active spiritual efforts. It is probably too soon to pass judgment yet on the system as a whole. The present writer believes that the Church's leaders made a mistake in 1919 in adopting the baptismal rather than the confirmation franchise as the basis of the electoral rolls. This has certainly meant that in some parishes a number of people have had their names on the roll who take no active part in the Church's life, though probably in most parishes it is only those who are confirmed who avail themselves of their privileges. One important piece of legislation passed by the Assembly has given to parochial church councils certain rights in regard to the appointment of incumbents (where the Crown is not the patron)—a measure which has proved beneficial in a considerable number of parishes. One of the weakest points of the system in regard to the representation of the laity is that the House of Laity in the Assembly itself cannot be said to be truly representative of the active laity of the Church. The House consists almost entirely of men and women of the professional and leisured classes and is also very largely composed of elderly people. The number of artisans could probably be counted on the fingers of one hand, and the number of members under forty on the fingers of two hands. It is, however, much easier to point out this weakness than to suggest a remedy. It is difficult to see how artisans, who probably constitute the large majority of the worshipping laity in our parishes, could ever find the time and opportunity of spending three weeks of the year in London; nor can one suggest a means by which any young man and woman, except in very rare cases, can be sufficiently widely known in a diocese to have any chance of being elected to the Assembly.

When we consider how far the Assembly has achieved its purpose of securing spiritual freedom for the Church, we come to a more acutely controversial matter. We can best begin to review this matter by recalling what was intended by the Church and State Committee in their 1916 Report. They recognized that it was obviously difficult to define exactly the boundaries between the civil and ecclesiastical powers. The veto of the State is essential under any form of establishment; but they point out that " the veto of the

State need not involve the sacrifice of spiritual independence, since, in the last resort, the Church may, at the cost of disestablishment, assert its inherent rights; but we recognize that in any form of establishment the State must have power to decide whether any legislation proposed by the Church would render the continuance of state recognition undesirable or even impracticable.

"After careful consideration we do not think that it would be found possible to delimit with any precision the sphere within which the Church Council" [*i.e.*, what came to be known as the National Assembly] "is to be recognized as having power to legislate. We believe that the Church of England has inherent authority to deal with all matters of doctrine, worship, and ritual, as affecting its own members, and to determine all questions of membership. If it attempted to exceed these limits, and make legislative proposals on matters not properly the affairs of the Church, the checks on the part of the State which we suggest would restrain it very speedily and easily." The Committee also recognized that the working of this system would require a certain sweet reasonableness on the part of Parliament as well as the Assembly. "Unless and until Parliament is willing to trust the Church to know what it wants and to make its demands in a reasonable form, no progress can be made. On the other hand, if Parliament is thus willing, we believe that the state machinery which we recommend will prove adequate to its purpose." During the nineteen years since the passing of the Enabling Act Parliament has actually rejected four Church Assembly measures—one dealing with City churches, one for the creation of a diocese of Shrewsbury, and the Revised Prayer Book measures of 1927 and 1928. This may seem to be a small number of rejections in relation to the total number of measures sent up to Parliament; but those of us who are in the Assembly are obliged to recognize that they do not represent the full extent of parliamentary control. It is by no means infrequent for the Assembly to defeat some proposal not because it thinks it undesirable, but because it is assured that if it were submitted to Parliament it would be rejected. Spiritual freedom is a matter of supreme importance at the present time, because in many countries there is an acute conflict between Church and State. Christianity has always recognized that the State has a legitimate though limited authority, and it is only shallow thinkers who would suggest

that it is easy to draw the line between the political and the spiritual. But while we are ready to condemn the interference of totalitarian states with the Church's life and work, it is well that we should remember that no totalitarian state has yet presumed to dictate to any Christian Church as to how it should administer the sacraments to the faithful: that act of interference in spiritual matters has been reserved for the British House of Commons. There are many who feel that the Church Assembly will never achieve fully the purposes for which it was brought into existence until there has been a drastic revision of the relations of Church and State, whether by disestablishment or by a scheme of self-government such as that enjoyed by the established Kirk of Scotland or on the lines suggested by the Church and State Commission of 1935. Bound up with this question is the problem of the revision of the Ecclesiastical Courts, which has more than once been considered by the Assembly. A measure passed in 1938 has considerably improved the law in regard to faculties; and the Assembly is at present considering an amendment of the law in regard to various matters of clergy discipline. But these matters only touch the fringe of the problem, and at present the Assembly seems disposed to shirk the larger issues.

There is considerable divergence of opinion, both within the Assembly and outside it, as to the value of debates and resolutions on matters of general interest. Some sections of the press are specially insistent that the Assembly should confine itself to business and leave general topics alone. On the other hand, it is important that the Church should have opportunities of making its voice heard on matters of importance, and the Assembly is the only body which includes the laity through which such opinions may be expressed. Apart from the actual resolutions passed there is also a value in the ventilation of Church opinion on these matters. Probably most members of the Assembly would agree that real good has resulted from debates on such topics as the abolition of slavery, unemployment, malnutrition, and the Christian attitude towards armaments.

The procedure of the Assembly on the whole works satisfactorily. The normal method in regard to legislative business is that the Assembly passes a resolution appointing a committee to draft a measure on certain general lines; the measure is then introduced and submitted for " General Approval," which roughly corresponds to the Second

Reading stage of a bill in Parliament; then comes the revision stage, when the measure is discussed clause by clause and amendments may be introduced (this revision may be done by the whole Assembly or in the case of minor measures by an appointed committee); finally the revised measure goes before the Assembly for final approval. On all matters of procedure the Assembly owes an immense debt to Lord Hugh Cecil and the two successive Archbishops who have presided over its deliberations.

There is a certain difference of opinion as to the wisdom or otherwise of the Archbishop of Canterbury being Chairman of the Assembly. There are some who feel that the Chairman should be a completely detached person like the Speaker of the House of Commons, and who think it unfair when the Chairman expresses any opinions on a controversial issue. On the other hand, it is clear that anyone who holds the office of Archbishop ought to give the Assembly the benefit of his guidance on difficult problems. Certainly our debates would be very greatly impoverished without the contributions of the present Archbishop. The idea of a Speaker-Chairman is attractive, yet it seems hardly consonant with Church order that anyone except the Archbishop should preside. Probably the present system is the best, even though it is anomalous in some respects.

Some sections of the secular press have given the impression that the Assembly is a battle-ground of two contending parties. This has very little foundation in fact. There are certain "groups" of members who meet together to discuss matters on the agenda; some of these are on party lines, and some are not, but if it were possible to examine the division lists of all important votes taken in the last ten years it would be found that there were very few occasions, if any, when all the high churchmen were on one side and all the low churchmen on the other. On the whole members show a real independence of judgment and a desire to understand and so far as possible to meet other people's points of view.

The Assembly is still in an experimental stage, for twenty years is a very short period in the life of the Church. But there is good reason to hope that the experiment will prove to be of permanent value. There is no exact parallel in other parts of Catholic Christendom to the Convocations of Canterbury and York; in these two provinces alone the concurrence of the inferior clergy is necessary before the

bishops may take synodical action. It has thus proved possible to give due weight to the opinions of the priesthood without encroaching upon the proper authority of the bishops. It may well be that the same two provinces are destined to work out a system by which the laity also may have a due voice in the affairs of the Church without any infringement of Catholic order. This will be the case if bishops and clergy are prepared to trust the laity as responsible fellow-members of the Church, and if the laity are prepared to respect the distinctive authority of bishops and priests. There are careful safeguards to secure that the initiative in actions affecting doctrine or worship must come from the House of Bishops and that the authority and privileges of the Convocations must be duly respected. Those who wish well to the Church Assembly should be particularly careful to safeguard the authority of Convocation.

The Assembly does not always have a good press. Minor incidents are exaggerated, unimportant speeches are reported at undue length, and often the rank and file of both clergy and laity gather a mistaken impression of our procedure. It would be well if more churchmen would take the trouble to buy and read the official report of the proceedings of the Assembly and if Assembly members would take every possible opportunity of reporting about its work to diocesan conferences, ruridecanal conferences and chapters, and parochial church councils.

PERCY HARTILL.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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NOTES

IS CHRISTIANITY A PRODUCT OF JUDAISM?

A GERMAN book which has won universal praise in its own country, but does not seem to have been noticed in England, is Eduard Wechssler's *Hellas im Evangelium* (Berlin, 1936). Professor of Romance languages in the University of Berlin, he is expert in many other branches of learning. His style is easy and attractive, even for a foreigner, and he maintains his thesis, which might easily have been made anti-Semitic, without ever deviating from scientific objectivity and appreciation of all that has kindled the spirit of humanity.

The problem is this. How did the new and strange teaching of Jesus run like a prairie-fire through the Greek and Roman world if it was essentially Jewish? Jesus must have transcended Judaism. This is shown by the fierceness of the antagonism which we see in Galatians, Acts xiii, John viii, etc., which reached its highest pitch in Marcion's rejection of the Old Testament. Wechssler will not solve the problem by supposing the records of Jesus to have been modified by the experience of the Church, or by postulating a chasm between Jesus and Paul. The intrinsic attractiveness of Jesus to the Greeks must come from Jesus Himself.

Jesus was formed by later Judaism, which had been greatly modified by Persian religion; by Greek religion, namely that of the Cynic-Stoic wandering preachers, themselves also influenced by Persian thought; and by universal humanity (if this is what is meant by *Volkstum* in this context). Our author collects a great many parallels between the Gospels and Gentile thought, which have been familiar to theologians from the days of Wetstein. No purpose would be served by quoting these, or by summarizing his attractive account of the synthesis which followed Alexander's conquests. What matters in his book is the attempt to *prove* direct contact with Greek religion. This again is not new, but the thesis can hardly have been stated before in so attractive a way.

Palestine in the time of Jesus was essentially a Greek country. Jesus must have known Greek, to converse with Pilate, the ruler of Capernaum, and the Syro-Phœnician woman. Art and architecture were Hellenistic. Even in Jerusalem synagogues of Hellenistic Greeks were found. Herod the Great was thoroughly Greek in outlook. Philip had his capital at Paneas (Cæsarea Philippi). Herod Antipas built Tiberias and gave it a Greek constitution with a *boule* and archons. Two hours north of Nazareth lay the Greek city Sepphoris, typical of " Galilee of the Gentiles." In such a land the necessities of life compelled Jews to become bilingual. The Greek names of the first disciples—Andrew, Philip, Thaddæus, etc.—are significant. The relation of Jesus to the beloved disciple is essentially Hellenic (but what about Jonathan and David ?). The brotherhood of the disciples is clearly a Greek *thiasos* (it does not occur to Wechssler that the Jewish *ḥaburah* is a more natural analogy).

Now notice that Jesus broke with Nazareth after His expulsion from the Synagogue and went to Capernaum, where in an hour or two He could get into the Gentile territory of Decapolis. But more important is the fact that He became an outdoor wandering preacher of the Cynic-Stoic type. In the streets and in the country He would attract non-Jews. In Decapolis especially He could not escape being in competition with Hellenistic sophists, rhetors, soul-doctors. His style of dialectic is also theirs. (We tend to forget that Gadara, etc., were famous centres of Greek philosophy and culture.) His downright speech is far removed from the style of the Rabbis.

But is not this an example of the dangerous " must have been " argument ? May we not suppose that Jesus everywhere kept to the Jewish " ghetto " when He went among the Gentiles ? The answer is found in the Gospels, with their continual references to Decapolis, Tyre and Sidon, Cæsarea Philippi, and the territory east of Jordan; even Samaria was largely Gentile. Two clear statements can be quoted: Matthew iv, 25, " great multitudes followed Him from Decapolis . . . and from beyond

Jordan"; and John vii, 35, "will He go . . . and teach the Gentiles?" which fits in with a Decapolis ministry.

This is a brief and inadequate summary of a powerful argument. The book confines itself to stating a case. Readers who have worked through Montefiore's books or Billerbeck's Rabbinic Commentary on the New Testament will have a sufficient prophylactic. Even more helpful is a knowledge of Dr S. A. Cook's recent books, which try to explain how Rabbinic Judaism went off at a tangent from the line represented by the prophets—2 Isaiah—Jesus. But we cannot but rejoice that the case against regarding Christianity as essentially Judaic can be presented with such complete absence of animus. Professor Wechssler has opened up vistas of fascinating speculation. If nothing else, he has strengthened the case for regarding Jesus as universal man.

W. K. L. C.

COMMENT ON PERIODICALS

(*a*) Theological

A useful study of the philosophical position of Mr Aldous Huxley by Professor A. E. Taylor was contained in *The New American Church Monthly*[1] for November, 1938. Dr Taylor has no difficulty in showing the essential weakness of his opponent's position, and his article will be of the utmost use to the non-philosophical reader who is seeking to avoid some plausible pitfalls. But we do not like the manner in which the same magazine allowed Dr Villari to defend the deeds of Fascist Italy. He has much to say concerning economic matters, but is strangely silent over such issues as Ethiopia or the political prisons. The Christian must be concerned with means as well as ends. A high standard of general theological information is maintained month by month in *The Expository Times*.[2] Two recent articles merit close attention. In the November number Sir F. G. Kenyon deals with investigation into the text of the New Testament during the last half-century, whilst in the December number there is an excellent essay upon the Incarnation and Political Ethics by the Rev. V. A. Demant. Students of Roman Catholic theology will appreciate a study of the whole subject of Credibility from the Thomist angle by Fr Aelrid Graham in the December number of *The Clergy Review*.[3] The same issue contains a study of J. H. Newman as a preacher which will appeal to all who are to be accounted among his admirers. The fact that the author is Mr Lewis May is a guaran-

[1] New York. 25c. [2] T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 10d. [3] Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2s.

tee of the standard of perception with which the mind of Newman is re-explored. The November number of *Blackfriars*[1] contained, among other good things, a review of Maritain by Fr Victor White and a short study of the economic situation by Joseph Clayton. In the December issue Fr Kelly discusses Dr Edwyn Bevan's attitude to the philosophical issues of symbolism, whilst Fr Brocklehurst writes of Georges Bernanos, the author of *The Diary of a Country Priest.* Specialists will find in the October number of *The Journal of Theological Studies*[2] contributions of weight from Fr Connolly, Dr Creed, Mr Frost, Dr W. E. Barnes, and Mr Driver. The essay upon "The Didache," by Dr Creed, is especially deserving of detailed study. Two articles in *The Modern Churchman*[3] for November are worthy of notice, that by Mr Dewick on the non-Christian religions and the memorial to Dr C. G. Montefiore from Mr Hubert Handley. The editorial notes contain a criticism of the recent proposal of the Dean of St Paul's to revise the XXXIX Articles. Clergy might do well to read the note on the Young Persons (Employment) Act in the December *Industrial Christian Fellowship Review*,[4] whilst the sensible article by Dr Vichert on the churches and the divinity schools in the Bulletin for October of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School[5] contained much seemingly relative to Anglican seminaries.

F. H. Amphlett Micklewright.

(*b*) Literary

Those who have read Dr Barlow's reflections in the December *Christendom* ("The Priest and Human Experience") will want to know more about this new kind of outside critic of the Church, who is interested in dogma and theology, in "the architecture of experience," but repelled by sentimentalism and Pelagianism. Dr Barlow himself has articles in the October *Criterion* ("Evolution involuted") and in the October-December *Purpose*[6] ("The Energetics of the Ocean"). He also flourishes in the *New English Weekly*,[7] where he has been criticizing National Socialism for an inadequate realism which forces the permanent things into another new and mechanical mould. The architecture of our own land and the tendency of modern political movements to act persistently *contra naturam* is also the theme of Mr T. S. Eliot's Commentary in the October *Criterion*, where he considers among other things the significance of Lord Lymington's *Famine in England.* "One sees no hope either in the Labour Party or in the equally unimaginative dominant section of the Conserva-

[1] Oxford. 1s. [2] Oxford University Press. 5s. quarterly. [3] Blackwell. 1s. [4] I.C.F. 1d. [5] New York. n.p. [6] 40, Great Russell Street, W.C. 1. 1s. quarterly. [7] 7 and 8, Rolls Passage, Chancery Lane, E.C. 4. 6d. weekly.

tive Party. There seems no hope in contemporary politics at all." As Mr H. A. Mason implies in an interesting article on the (American) *New Republic* and the problem of literary journalism, in the December *Scrutiny*,[1] this is not very practical help. Yet he is bogged by the difficulty of applying those critical standards for which *Scrutiny* has now struggled for over six years. " What is ordinarily understood by politics is (apart from religion) the element with the highest resistance to such inclusion in a general view." " It will not do . . . to infer directly and naïvely from the prose style of a politician his capabilities as a statesman."

But there are underlying issues concerning the land, the health of education, and the plight of a rootless culture, which trouble the editors of *Scrutiny* and *The Criterion*. Who is concerned with these in practical politics ? *Colosseum* now finds a rooted culture in the Spain of Franco and the Portugal of Salazar, and chats gaily of Eurasia, where " intolerance is the essence of culture in Arabia not less than in Hungary, Poland, or Spain." But " Odysseus," so cheerful about Chamberlain, Mussolini, and the Runciman report on Czecho-Slovakia, seems strangely behind the times in his reading of *The Criterion*, full of " book reviews about poetry or criticism " which are choked with " arid and transitory smoke-screens " of " Marxist scholasticism " concealing " real people with genuine problems sooner or later to emerge once more." When *Colosseum* started in 1934 this was fairly plausible, and I would not deny that a good deal of Marxist dialectic about literature still survives in places (Oxford, the home of lost causes). But as a description of the last five numbers of *The Criterion* it is fantastic. Tell that to the ultra-marines ! While those who take to Communism and Fascism seem to lose sensitivity and humour, *Purpose* commends the cause of Social Credit by a sure touch on a variety of interests. Particularly I would commend Mr Michael Roberts's contribution to the symposium on the modern mood which is now running. If " the intellectual schoolboy " now reads Eliot and reacts from materialism at the age when his father took to Huxley and Bradlaugh, the fact has an important bearing on pastoral problems. GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M.

[1] Deighton, Bell & Co., Cambridge. 2s. 6d. quarterly.

SURVEYS

(A) SOME RECENT BOOKS ON DOCTRINE

Church of England Doctrine, by R. S. T. Haslehurst, Vice-Chancellor of Chichester Cathedral (S.P.C.K., 2 vols., 2s. each), is written as a study book on the Report of the Doctrine Commission, *Doctrine in the Church of England*. It is intended to be used along with the Report, which is divided up into sections for discussion, and very careful references to the pages of the Report are always given. At the end of each volume there are questions for discussion upon each chapter as well as some suggestions of small books suitable for further reading by members of lay groups. But the volumes will doubtless also be found useful by clerical study groups which are engaged in a study of the Doctrine Report. There are plenty of illustrations and the exposition is always fresh and clear. The first volume deals with " God and Redemption " and the second with " The Church and Sacraments and Eschatology "; the volumes might be used separately.

The Christ of God, by H. Balmforth, Headmaster of St Edmund's School, Canterbury (S.C.M. Press, 2s. 6d.), is also a scholarly little study-book intended for lay discussion groups. It is the third volume in the " Diocesan Series." There are questions for discussion upon each of its six chapters, and a pamphlet containing suggestions and helps for group-leaders may be obtained from the S.C.M. Press; this pamphlet has been specially prepared for use with the book by Canon Duncan Armytage (3d. post free). The doctrine of the Person of Christ is carefully expounded in such a way as to hold the interest of the ordinary layman and to meet his difficulties and questionings. We hope that this little book will be widely used in the parishes.

The History of the Creeds, by F. J. Badcock, Fellow of St Augustine's College, Canterbury (S.P.C.K., 12s. 6d.), is a second edition of this work, which was first published in 1930. Those who are acquainted with the careful and scholarly work of Dr Badcock will be grateful for this new edition, which contains, besides certain corrections, a considerable quantity of new material. Chapters VIII-X, on the Roman Creed at various dates, contain the newest things in the book. A useful introductory letter " to the theological student " gives practical advice on how to read the book, and should be helpful to anyone coming to the study of this intricate subject for the first time. This is a book for the scholar and the theological student; it is too technical for the general reader who does not possess the necessary theological background.

The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life, by Karl Barth, translated by R. Birch Hoyle (Frederick Muller, 5s.), consists of a lecture delivered at Elberfeld in October, 1929. It meets two criticisms, the first of which is frequently made against Barth in this country—namely, that he has no place for the Holy Spirit in his theology. The second criticism, that he has " Catholic leanings," is met by his countering of the doctrine of *analogia entis* as taught by the Jesuit, Erich Przywara, which has its roots in Augustinianism and the Catholic theology laid down at Trent. Those who are interested in continental theology to-day, and who do not easily read German, will be grateful to the translator for giving them this important work in English, and for the very copious footnotes, which explain references in the text to works which are not easily accessible to the English reader. Barth argues that the human spirit, unassisted, is incapable of hearing God's Word; to make man hear the Word of God, and thus to make the Christian life possible, is the work of the Holy Spirit. He makes a continual polemic against the modern liberal doctrine of divine immanence, which assumes that " the Holy Spirit is man's own spirit "; and his doctrine of the Spirit, unlike that of the liberals, does not include any conception of the work of the Spirit in " secular " spheres (like politics, international relations, social amelioration, etc.). The use of the word " Christian " in connexion with such spheres is deprecated: to side with Luther and Calvin (who are by no means spent forces), and not with Augustine, he says, should make it more difficult " for such an adjective as this to drip from our lips and our pen." He asks who gives us permission to speak of " Christian " morality, " Christian " families, " Christian " art, " Christian " societies, and so on. The Christian life is the work of the Holy Spirit, and we must guard against attributing to human activities the character of the life which is given by God alone.

The Healing Cross, by H. H. Farmer (Nisbet, 6s.), consists of a collection of twenty-one sermons, or " sermonic essays," written around the central message of the Christian faith, which it is the task of the Christian preacher to deliver. At the heart of that message there is the Cross, which, although it is the *healing* Cross, does not cease to be—Cross. The note of austerity must always be sounded, so that the Gospel which brings comfort and peace and joy will bring also challenge and demand; otherwise, in face of the brutal realities of modern life, it will seem like " a mere twittering of birds over a volcano." It will seem too easy to be true. To strike the note of austerity does not mean to find a modern substitute for the terrors of hell; it means that the message itself should have the note of severity running through it: " it must be a call which demands as well as succours, nay,

succours because it demands, and demands because it succours." To stress the goodness of God and to miss the note of His severity will merely confirm the suspicion of the psychologists that religion is merely a way of escape, " a way of whistling to keep up the courage in the dark." Again, the message must be commensurate with the great forces which sweep through the modern world. The modern man is world-minded: the newspapers, the radio, the cinema, all tend to make him so. He will therefore not listen to a message which is merely parish-wide or denomination-wide; it will seem too small to be true. He must be shown that the Christian faith is a faith for the world, and that the ecumenical movement is a reality to-day. He must hear the message against the background of the world conferences of Oxford and Edinburgh, 1937. " The Church is the one supernational and world-wide society in a world which appears to be flying to pieces." Again, the message must have a strongly agnostic note running through it, which stresses the ultimate mystery of God and His Providence: it must not be made to seem too confident to be true, as Job's comforters appeared to Job. All these recommendations, which are outlined in the preface, are carried into effect in each of the subsequent sermons. Here is preaching as it ought to be: relevant to the life of the ordinary man and to the problems of the modern world which engross his attention, yet how much more than mere topical commentary on current events ! How adequately is the eternal message stated in terms of the common life of to-day ! Those to whom has been committed the ministry of the Word would do well to study these sermons and use them as a model, or at least as an ideal, for their own preaching. But it is to be hoped that the book will be read not only by parsons, but by laymen who are faced with understanding the Gospel message in terms of their daily lives and problems. It is a pity that the habit of reading sermons has largely fallen into desuetude amongst lay folk: perhaps if more preachers of the quality of Professor Farmer were to publish their sermons, this habit would be revived, and an old method of deepening faith with understanding might be rediscovered.

Why the Cross ?, by the Rev. Edward Leen, C.S.Sp. (Sheed and Ward, 7s. 6d.), deals with the subject of the necessity of the Cross from the Roman Catholic point of view. It is chiefly interesting perhaps because it illustrates the way in which Roman Catholic theologians confront the disorders of the modern world and prescribe their cure. The Reformers of the sixteenth century are, of course, primarily to blame: " the economic, social and political principles that issued from their dogmatic positions, contained, in germ, the social, economic and political evils which afflict European civilization to-day "

(p. 5). And, of course, the solution of all our problems lies in submission to the teaching of the Roman Church. But the world will not listen. We should note " the world's attitude towards the Papal instructions on industrial problems. . . . Christ's Vicar on earth outlines in clear terms a plan of economic reform which would effectively remedy human misery—and, for the most part, his words pass unheeded " (p. 63, footnote). This introductory section is not the only part of the book which will probably strike a non-Roman Catholic as somewhat crude. For instance, purification of the soul by suffering must be accomplished here or hereafter; " it costs much less in this world than in the world to come " (p. 96); St Catherine of Genoa is quoted: " No tongue can confess, no mind can conceive what is the pain of Purgatory. The pain experienced there is in its intensity like the pain of hell itself." Yet Purgatory, we are told, is the " loving invention " of God (p. 97). We read a good deal about " Christ's philosophy of existence "; " Christ's philosophy of existence is that God is the unique source of happiness. . . . He concludes, therefore, that man can be happy only in the measure in which he captures God's happiness. The way to this, He points out, lies through the conquest of self-indulgence, self-exaltation and self-worship " (p. 181). Is this the Christ of the New Testament ?

The Epiphany of the Cross, by F. W. Buckler (Heffer, 3s. 6d.), contains four lectures delivered in Trinity Cathedral, Cleveland, Ohio, during Epiphany, 1935. The argument seems to be that our Lord established the Kingdom of God on earth in some military sense, just as Cyrus the Great or Alexander established kingdoms on earth (see p. 16). Jesus was a military strategist and a lawyer (pp. 13 *f.*). Nietzsche understood our Lord's doctrine of the Kingdom of God on earth better than any man in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (p. 67). But it is not a Kingdom on earth in the sense in which the upholders of the Social Gospel meant it (Professor Buckler does not like the Social Gospel). It is a pity that we are not given the authorities which presumably lie behind certain statements—*e.g.*, that James, the Lord's half-brother, was head of the Pharisaic party for thirty years, as Messiah, or as King of the Jews to the sect of the Pharisees (p. 26). One wonders what exactly is the meaning behind all this show of scholarship and oriental lore.

The Mystery of Mary, by Bede Frost (Mowbray, 5s.), argues that " most of the modern Protestant attitude towards Mary arises from an imperfect apprehension of the fact that the Christian religion is concerned with living persons." Mary and the saints are thus regarded as " dead Roman Catholics " who must not even be thought of (p. 39). This book endeavours

to explain what the true Catholic doctrine concerning St Mary really is. The Virgin Birth, the Compassion of Mary, the Immaculate Conception, the Assumption of Mary, and so on, are all presented as part of a rational faith compared with which all " non-Catholic Biblical criticism " is as the " speculations of Christian Science or of the British-Israel delusion " (pp. 58 *f.*). (Incidentally, what is the authority for saying that St Matthew's Gospel was written between A.D. 60 and 68? —see p. 53.) This is the kind of book which might make many despair of human reason altogether, and admit that Karl Barth was right after all! The author certainly seems to hold " eccentric views as to what constitutes evidence," but the book contains many moving and even beautiful passages.

Creeds in Conflict, by L. J. Belton (Dent, 6s.), surveys the sects and cults to be found in Britain outside the main stream of the Christian and Jewish traditions. Its subtitle is " A Study in Contemporary Faiths," and the latter include Fundamentalism or Bibliolatry (several kinds), British Israel, Adventism, Anthroposophy, Christian Science, Mazdaznan, Mormonism (did you know that the Mormons or Latter-Day Saints claim to have made 126,000 British converts during the last century?), Spiritualism, Theosophy, Occultism, Rosicrucianism, Buchmanism, Yoga, Buddhism and Islam. What a lot of people hold eccentric views as to what constitutes evidence! Perhaps we had better stick to reason after all! If anyone wishes to learn something about our stranger sects, or to make a study of the abnormal psychology of religion, he will find that this book gives plenty of information. The author, a Unitarian minister and leader, gives some account of his own spiritual autobiography, and he seems to look forward to a day when the religions of the world will unite in fellowship upon a common basis, which includes belief in a " unitary Presence, or Universal Self," the sanctity of all life, the supremacy of Love and the values, and the essential divinity of Man.

ALAN RICHARDSON.

(B) CHURCH AND STATE IN GERMANY

To understand the politico-religious situation in Germany to-day, one must go back at least to the time of the Reformation. Men tend to be conservative in their religious, even more than in their political, ideas; and the principles established before and during the Reformation are still influential in determining various people's attitudes to-day.

In the political sphere, the dominant fact is the traditional disunity of the many German states, and the consequent frequency of foreign invasion and domination. These experiences

have given rise to the exaggerated passion for national unity in the minds of such men as Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Hitler, and to the increasing realization of their desires. Religiously also Germany has been perhaps more sharply divided than any other country in Europe. This has tended to make Christianity unpopular among the protagonists of national unity. They have also naturally objected to its internationalism —particularly as sponsored by the " imperialism " of Roman Catholicism.

More important, and more complex, have been the relations between Lutheranism and the state: these call for a fuller examination. Luther's own thought is " so torrential and sometimes so inconsistent that it is most difficult to understand or to condense."[1] Tawney refers to his utterances on social morality as " the occasional explosions of a capricious volcano."[2] He can hardly be called a great constructive thinker: indeed he is often content merely to repeat the teaching of the great scholastic writers. Thus in his earlier writings he retains much of the grand Catholic conception that all the departments of life are to be regulated in accordance with the laws of God. But this he increasingly modified by the application of a distinction—which had gradually grown up in the minds of men who wished to shake off the control of the Church—between the spiritual sphere and the secular. Appalled by the worldliness of the contemporary Church, he was led to differentiate very sharply between these spheres. His reading of St Paul's Epistles (which were to him " more of a Gospel than Matthew, Mark or Luke ") convinced him that salvation is to be acquired not by works, let alone indulgences, but solely by " faith "—the personal consciousness and acceptance of God's pardoning grace.

But whereas freedom (which Luther identified with this highly subjective state of " faith," or assurance of salvation) rules in the spiritual sphere, in the " natural " sphere the fundamental principle is authority. Especially when the leaders of the Peasants' Revolt had claimed the support of the New Testament which Luther had just translated for their anti-feudalistic program (which, though moderate enough in its beginnings, had given rise to wholesale plunder and bloodshed), the great Reformer insisted that the life of " faith " was not concerned with the " natural " problems of politics and society. Bitterly though he attacked the unchristian character of the German princes, it was from some of them that he had received indispensable support in his battle with Rome. Thus rather than urge the application of Christian principles to questions

[1] L. Pullan, *Religion since the Reformation*, p. 70. [2] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Pelican edition, p. 92.

of state, he inculcated an almost unquestioning obedience to the powers that be. He took Romans xiii, 1-7, with its counsels of submission to the Roman Empire of the day (which, with all its faults, was nevertheless the best imperial government that the world had yet seen), as a maxim for all time. The " Orders " of the secular world were sacred and inviolable because God had made them. It was thus extremely awkward for Luther when the Emperor Charles V waged war against the Protestants, but he eventually squared his conscience with the jurists' quibble that the Emperor had acted *ultra vires* by taking action against Luther's doctrines before they had been condemned by an ecumenical council, and then made up for this *volte face* by the violence of his support of the Protestant princes against the Emperor.[1] Thus the chief political outcome of Luther's activity has been the strengthening, not of the Holy Roman Empire (as St Paul's text demands), but of those absolutist principalities which were the precursors of the sovereign national state. Tawney concludes that while his doctrine that the soul is justified by faith alone " enormously deepened spiritual experience, and sowed the seed from which new freedoms, abhorrent to Luther, were to spring," yet " it riveted on the social thought of Protestantism a dualism which, as its implications were developed, emptied religion of its social content, and society of its soul."[2] Meanwhile " authority, expelled from the altar, finds a new and securer home upon the throne."

Most Lutherans have clung tenaciously to Luther's sharp distinction between religion and politics. But not all have followed him in holding that the " Orders " of the natural world were to be accepted as they stood: many, whom Troeltsch has called " ascetic " Protestants, have turned their backs upon the " natural " world as being wholly evil. But the practical result of this quietism or *Weltflucht* is just the same as that of the Lutheranism which glorifies the state as being the creation of God. For if you decline to soil your hands in secular affairs, you support the powers that be. It is no accident, then, that Lutheranism, although it has coexisted with democratic régimes in America and Sweden, is usually found to be supporting an absolutist form of government, and has never had much hold upon the proletariat. Especially has this been the case in Prussia, where Bismarck's oppression of the Social Democrats has been called " the logical continuation of Luther's oppression of the peasants."[3]

One result of Luther's support of the princes was the principle accepted as a compromise between the Catholics and Protestants at the Peace of Augsburg, whereby the different provinces

[1] *Cf.* R. Pascal, *The Social Basis of the German Reformation*, pp. 170 *ff.*
[2] Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 102 *f.* [3] Pascal, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

adopted the creed of their ruler—*cuius regio eius religio*. The way was thus left open for other modifications of belief, especially Calvinism, of which Heidelberg became a centre. Calvinism, with its much greater stress upon the Church as a social organism, was far from turning its back upon secular society as being in a completely different sphere from religion: on the contrary, it was the first branch of Christianity to give a religious sanction to the rapidly developing financial structure of urban commerce, which Catholic teachers had stigmatized as being rooted in such " sins " as usury. Far closer than Lutheranism to the scholastic tradition of aiming at the sanctification of the whole of life, it was also far more zealous than the Catholic Church had been in the application of its social principles. But the danger of its predestinarianism was that it led to complacency with the world as it was: and it too had increasingly to make compromises with the secular powers. And it is typical of both systems that it was at the command of the King (whose predecessors had long since been Calvinists) that the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches in Prussia were united in 1817. But there still continued nearly thirty separate Protestant Churches in the other German states, each with a slightly different constitution. Thus one may say that Protestantism has fostered nationalist absolutism in Prussia, but national disunity in Germany as a whole. But it is Prussia which has led the way in the unification of the German nation. And here it was left to the Catholics to fight for Christian freedom in the " Kulturkampf " against Bismarck. Harnack's " social gospel " school was but a drop in the ocean. The failure of the Protestant Churches to infect the politics of Prussia with more of the spirit of true Christianity has had disastrous consequences which are becoming increasingly manifest to-day. And it is an open question how far the state-glorification of Hegel, the chauvinism of Fichte and Bismarck, even the racialism of H. S. Chamberlain and the Nazis, are logically descended from the ideas of the great Reformer who did more than anyone else to give Germany her common language.

When we turn to recent pagan religious organizations, we find the same insistence upon a largely irrational " faith " or subjective conviction, and the same stress upon the " givenness " of the natural world: but whereas Luther made a sharp distinction between the spheres of faith and nature, the modern pagan, whose nationalism has become his sole religion, sees them as one. It is almost true to say that the object of his " faith " *is* " nature." In the humanistic nationalism of the Nazis, whose closest parallel is perhaps the State-Shintoism of Japan, the things that are God's are almost wholly rendered to Cæsar. Baldur von Schirach's " I believe simply in Germany " is echoed by many thousands. Instead of a sense of sin, which according

to Rosenberg " always goes hand in hand with physical and racial cross-breeding," the talk is all of the " divine spark " in all Aryans, with Hitler as their Messiah.

Hitler himself has deceived many both inside and outside Germany by stating that his party stands for " positive Christianity "—in contrast to the negative Christianity of the Churches. But it is now clear that this " positive Christianity " is simply a cloak for National Socialism. The only justification for the term is the reduction of unemployment, winter relief work, removal of class-barriers, etc., which, at great cost, the Nazis have achieved: for the rest it seeks to eradicate the Old Testament, the Judaizing St Paul (who " planned a world revolution against the Roman Empire !") and St Augustine with their un-Aryan stress upon sin, and such " feminine exaggerations as turning the other cheek "—which is not to be found in the earliest Gospel ! The Jesus whom Rosenberg admires is " the impetuous preacher who stormed in the Temple . . . not the crucified." His " Holy Land " is Germany.

There is a small party, the so-called *German Christians*, who even champion these views inside the Evangelical Church ! They are an extreme instance of Lutheran acceptance of the secular powers as ordained of God. Their numbers are not large—except when Hitler himself has ordered the party-members to go to church and then vote in the elections: most Nazis prefer to have nothing to do with the Church, and regard even German Christians with suspicion. But the appearance of these Nazi wolves in sheep's clothing may serve as a warning to us against the danger of a too extreme modernism: still more do they demonstrate the dangers of this Lutheran tradition—whose chief theoretical exponents to-day are Gogarten,[1] who glorifies the state because without it man is so radically evil, Althaus, and Hirsch,[2] who is closer to humanism and German idealism.

But even before the rise to power of the German Christians in 1933-34, a vigorous protest against the Lutheran acceptance of the natural " Orders " as absolute had been made by the Swiss theologian Karl Barth.[3] He combines the world-renouncing side of Lutheranism with a Calvinistic stress on the transcendent majesty of God and the need for humble obedience to His will, to the exclusion of all worldly authority, in *all* the affairs of life. Barth's message, expressed in a highly coloured paradoxical (he would call it " dialectical ") style, has brought new life to a Church which was dying of academic inanition; but it must be added that his uncompromising hostility not merely to Prussianism but to the very highest of human culture

[1] *Cf.* Ehrenström, *Christian Faith and the Modern State*, pp. 112-120.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 120-125. [3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 125-132.

has alienated many, especially when that message has been systematized at a more pedestrian level by his followers, who often lack the wit and the spirituality of the prophet himself.

A *via media* between the extremes of Barthianism and Naturalism is to be found in the writings of his former associate, Emil Brunner.[1] He also starts from God's self-revelation in Christ as his exclusive criterion, but holds that it is possible to give a specifically Christian interpretation of social institutions in the light of it. The state, nation, family, etc., are not ethically neutral, still less wholly sinful, but are agents of a divine purpose; thus " they are ' orders ' in accordance with which we have to act because in them—even if only in a fragmentary and indirect way—God's will meets us." But as evil is also always present in social institutions, he holds that it is the duty and privilege of Christians to work, under God's grace, for their reform. It is encouraging to note that many Lutherans are moving closer to this Calvinistic view that the Church has social duties.[2]

Since 1933 the increasingly severe persecution of the Christian Churches has led many Evangelical pastors to protest—in the teeth of the Lutheran tradition—against the high-handed actions of the Nazi government. When Lutherans of all people find themselves in opposition to the state, there is clearly something seriously wrong. The fact is that National Socialism has become, even in the Lutheran sense of the term, a religion. The gulf between religion and politics has been rudely bridged by an invasion of the totalitarian state into the religious sphere. The chief expression of this was the attempt to impose the German Christian army chaplain Müller as Bishop of all the local Churches co-ordinated into one. This led to the formation of the Emergency League of Pastors, who found this intolerable; and at Barmen in May, 1934, they formed themselves into the *Confessional Church* (so-called because they stood by the Reformation " Confessions " of faith). This has two branches: (1) *The Lutheran Council*, an amalgamation of the leaders of the so-called " intact " provincial Churches, where a definite split into opposing camps of Confessionals and German Christians has so far been avoided, and self-administration has been largely preserved, thanks to compliance with the state's demands as far as Lutheran consciences will allow. (2) The *Provisional Administration*, supported by Niemöller, Barth, and those who refuse to compromise on any fundamental Christian principles, which governs the confessionals in the " disintegrated " Churches, where the official government is in the hands of the German Christians.

After the virtual replacement of Bishop Müller by Dr Werner,

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 133-141, 184-188, 197-210.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 176 *ff.*

the young lawyer whom the state has appointed President of the Prussian Church, and the use by Kerrl, Reichsminister for Church Affairs, of illegal decrees and the Secret Police against Christians, these two branches of the Confessional Church have tended increasingly to make common cause. But an unfortunate split has been caused by the issue by the *Provisional Administration* during the Czech crisis last September of a form of service which confesses *inter alia* the sins of the German Church and people, and prays for Christians in other countries. The State has used this as an excuse to stop the salaries of the offending pastors, while Bishop Marahrens, Chairman of the *Lutheran Council*, in a letter to his pastors on November 17, says that " such a confusion of religion and politics is just what we have always most strenuously resisted." And yet in his own suggested form of prayer he does not hesitate to pray " for the Führer, who in the struggle against Bolshevism must know that we support him with all our might," and " for the liberation of our blood-brothers, who have been separated from us by unjust treaties and hostile force." In other words the sanctioning of Nazi *Macht-politik* is for him no mixing of religion and politics !

One could wish for less of Luther's attitude towards the princes, and more of the spirit in which he stood up to the papacy. But that is what the *Provisional Administration* is supplying, with great courage and at great cost. And it is to be hoped that they will succeed in rallying the more cautious *Lutheran Council* to make common cause in the battle for Christianity. They lack the foreign connexions of the Catholic Church (whose bishops have openly referred in friendly terms to their Protestant allies): but they have put up as gallant a struggle, and as for the deficiency, it is one which only their brother-Christians, for whose sake they are being afflicted, can make good by understanding its issues and rendering such help as may be in their power to give.

Besides the literature cited, the subject can be studied in the following books:

N. Sykes: *The Crisis of the Reformation* (Unicorn Press, 1938). 3s. 6d.

T. M. Lindsay: *A History of the Reformation* (Clark, 1906). Vol. I.

E. Troeltsch: *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (Allen and Unwin). Two vols. 42s.

J. S. Schapiro: *Social Reform and the Reformation* (Columbia Univ., 1909).

R. Niebuhr: *Do State and Nation belong to God or the Devil?* (S.C.M.). 6d.

A. Duncan-Jones: *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany* (Gollancz, 1938). 8s. 6d.

A. Frey: *Cross and Swastika* (S.C.M., 1938). 6s.

W. Gurian: *Hitler and the Christians* (Sheed and Ward, 1936). 5s.

" A Confessional Pastor ": In the *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1938.

Useful pamphlets on the present Church struggle have been published by the Friends of Europe, 122, St Stephen's House, Westminster, S.W. 1 (a long series at 3d. each, and a monthly journal); by the International Department, Transport House, Smith Square, S.W. 1; by the World Student Christian Federation, Geneva, Rue Calvin 13 (also from Annandale, London, N.W. 11); and by the Kulturkampf Association, 19, Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, W.C. 2. This also publishes fortnightly bulletins from the standpoint of the Catholics and Confessional Church.

H. P. Kingdon.

BOOK REVIEWS

PROPHECY AND DIVINATION AMONG THE HEBREWS AND OTHER SEMITES. By Alfred Guillaume. The Bampton Lectures, 1938. Hodder and Stoughton. 20s.

In the course of his eight lectures and seven additional notes, Dr Guillaume ranges from ancient Sumeria to fourteenth-century Spain, but his central theme is " Prophecy and Divination " (which are taken to include blessing, cursing, and the mystical ecstasy) as they may be seen in the Hebrew Scriptures and in certain Muslim writings.

Lecture I is an account of " The Sumero-Babylonian Religion." Here Dr Guillaume gives his assent to the theory of a " Myth and Ritual pattern " which spread from ancient Sumeria to all parts of the ancient Semitic world except the inner recesses of the Arabian desert.

Lecture II, entitled " The Hebræo-Arabian Religion," deals with Hebrew religion up to, and including, the time of Moses. Dr Guillaume is rightly distrustful of all attempts to reconstruct primitive Semitic nomad religion, and shows, in particular, how baseless is Nielsen's theory of an " Old Arabian Moon-religion." On the other hand, he believes in " the general trustworthiness of the ancient strands in the biographies of the patriarchs," considers Moses to have been " the Restorer, not the Founder, of the religion of Jehovah among his people " (p. 93), and seems to regard the vision of Moses and the seventy elders (Exodus xxiv, 9, 10) as an actual experience, comparable to those described in Isaiah vi and Ezekiel i.

Lectures III and IV, entitled " Divinatory Prophecy," deal with the " mechanism " of Arabian and Hebrew prophecy and divination. Three ways of reaching or expressing prophetic conclusions are illustrated from Arabic and Hebrew writings: divination from common objects which happen to meet the diviner's eye at the moment when a message is sought; divination from chance sayings; acted signs.

Lecture V, entitled " Dreams and Visions," contains an account of Maimonides' theory of dreams and visions as the chief medium of divine revelation; a summary of the views of Ibn Khaldûn (A.D. 1332-1406) on divination and the significance of dreams; a consideration of the dreams and visions in the Bible and in Mr J. W. Dunne's *An Experiment with Time*. Dr Guillaume gives it as his opinion that " even in our own day veridical dreams have an importance greater than is generally recognized " (p. 228) . . . " probably it is only the sense of personal unworthiness and failure to live in the light of such visions (*i.e.*, any revelation which may come to a man when he is praying or meditating) which prevent large numbers of people

from speaking of illuminating voices which . . . would justify the exordium of prophecy: Thus saith the Lord " (p. 217).

Lecture VI (and Additional Note D) deal with " Magic and Sorcery," and the technique of blessing and cursing amongst the Arabs and the Hebrews. Dr Guillaume accepts Mowinckel's view that some of the Psalms are prayers against sorcerers, but not for Mowinckel's reasons.

Lecture VII, entitled " Ecstasy," treats of " what may be called the dervish-like activities of inspired men, of the madness of possession, of the rapture of mystics and of the inspiration of poets " (p. 296). Nearly half the lecture is occupied by accounts of Muslim dervishes and of the answers of the Mystic al-Ghazzâlî (A.D. 1059-1111) to objectors to ecstasy and to the practice of listening to music. Dr Guillaume writes at length about Muslim dervishes because " the modern dervish is the spiritual descendant of the ancient Hebrew ecstatic," and from him " much may be learned which will throw light on the inner life of the prophets " (p. 302).

Lecture VIII, entitled " Personal Religion," is chiefly concerned with Jeremiah, and, as Dr Guillaume admits, owes much to Dr Skinner's book *Prophecy and Religion.*

Dr Guillaume deserves our thanks for having collected a large amount of relevant information which is not within the reach of the ordinary student of Hebrew prophecy; for a number of valuable philological notes on Hebrew words; for insisting on the fundamental difference between Hebrew religion and the other Semitic religions with which it has so many formal things in common; for writing in a way which could not wound the religious feelings of any believer, Muslim, Jewish or Christian. Some readers, however, may feel that occasionally he is disposed to overstate his case (*e.g.*, when he paraphrases Jeremiah vii, 21-23: " I *did* speak about matters of sacrifice but only in reference to the offerings of those who obey me," p. 378); that he sometimes pays too little heed to the literary criticism of the Old Testament, and at other times overestimates the historical element in ancient legends.

We notice misprints on p. 129, n. 3; p. 341, n.; p. 382, l. 4; p. 397, l. 25.

F. S. Marsh.

A Rabbinic Anthology: selected and arranged with comments and introductions. By C. G. Montefiore and H. Loewe. Macmillan. 18s.

This book is almost the despair of the reviewer, for it combines exact scholarship with an attempt to popularize the subject amounting at times to cheapness. The body of the work consists of over sixteen hundred extracts from the Rabbinic writings, which illustrate their views on God's Love for Israel; Israel's Love

for God; The Law; Prayer; Charity; The Family; The Life to Come; and so forth. The translations are accurate, and although one may look in vain for the well-known description of the World to Come as a day that is all Sabbath, yet the student or the layman will gain a very good idea of the religion of the Rabbis from a perusal of this book.

On the other hand, both the Introductions—and they run to a hundred odd pages between them—as well as many of the comments throughout the book, give the impression that the editors have not decided in their own minds whether they are writing for the scholar or the man in the street. While the compass of the book, and the detailed references to learned works in the comments, presuppose more than a passing interest in the subject, the scholar may feel that many of the " popular " expressions used are cheap and out of place. In the last category come such phrases as " There is no eyewash about it [the Rabbinic literature] " (p. xviii), " the Rabbis are always in undress " (p. xviii), " Mr Montefiore's pin sticks in my gizzard " (p. 356)—the latter followed by one of Mr Loewe's more irrelevant passages in justification of his own particular point of view.

Not all the notes and comments, however, are on this level. The first two extracts in the " Anthology," to take an example, deal with the Nature of God, and the recitation of the *Shema*. Mr Montefiore comments on the use of the *Shema* as a creed, and refers the reader to Mr Loewe's fuller note (p. 641). The main points in connexion with the *Shema* are here set out with fairly detailed references. But forty years ago Blau suggested that the *Shema* originated as a monotheistic declaration against dualism, and this suggestion was repeated by Kohler (*The Origins of the Synagogue and the Church*, ed. H. G. Enelow [New York, 1929], p. 57). The addition of these references might have strengthened Mr Loewe's remarks. Again, the fact that the Church ceased to use the *Shema* as Jesus did, may not perhaps be entirely incapable of explanation. For the old Gaonic traditions tell how the Jews were forbidden by the Romans to recite the *Shema* in public. They therefore had recourse to the subterfuge of including it in the *Kedushah* of the *Amidah* (the references are given by Finkelstein in *R.E.J.*, vol. xciii, p. 7). If the Jews, then, were forbidden to recite the *Shema*, the Jewish Christians must have fallen under the same ban. This was about A.D. 135, and by the time the Jews were free to restore the *Shema* to their daily services the Christian Church was already developing along lines of its own. The *Shema* had simply disappeared.

Mr Loewe also contributes a valuable excursus on the Rabbis, their generations, and their countries; and another on the dating of rabbinic material.

Mr R. H. Snape's essay on Rabbinical and Early Christian Ethics is one of the best things in the book. It is carefully

written, well-documented, and scholarly. Here one finds none of the special pleading, none of the personal explanation, none of the tiresome verbosity which characterize much of the book. He takes A.D. 250 as roughly the dividing line between the early period in which "Christian ethics were in the main Judaic," and the period of theological speculation stimulated by the influx of Hellenic philosophy.

The excellent Glossary and full Indices will greatly help the reader in his use of this massive work, which might well be described as a fitting epitaph for C. G. Montefiore.

C. W. DUGMORE.

JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY. Vol. III: "Law and Religion." Edited by E. I. J. Rosenthal. The Sheldon Press. 10s. 6d.

This is the concluding volume of the series on Judaism and Christianity. In bulk it is smaller than its predecessors, and it is perhaps a pity that the diminution of size has been achieved by a reduction of the space allotted to notes and references; this is especially regrettable in the case of the first two lectures by Dr Murphy on the primitive origins of law in relation to religion and Dr Fish on law and religion in Babylonia. In the case of the latter there is a short bibliography: but of the eight books mentioned three are in Italian, and therefore not accessible to a large number of readers. (The rest are all French or German.) In view of the apparent paucity of English works a larger supply of notes would have been an advantage. The lectures in themselves are admirable.

In some ways the most interesting of all is the lecture by Dr Edward Robertson on the Samaritans, since he covers ground which is but little known. His general thesis is that the Samaritans, as a settled community with no considerable Diaspora, were not driven to Jewish expedients of interpreting the Torah to adapt it to varying circumstances; their apocalyptic literature is mainly based on that of Judaism, though it has to be centred on a redeemer ruling from Mount Gerizim, who may be Joseph, Joshua or Moses. Dr Wheeler Robinson seems to me to go astray over the relation of Torah and *Nomos*; he follows Professor Dodd in holding that the use of the Greek word *nomos* "resulted in a falsely legalistic emphasis for the Hellenistic Jews." Actually I believe that the reverse is the case; it was the Stoic conception of Nomos as the immanent divine Reason as expressing itself in the social and political life of man which gave to the Judaism of Alexandria the conception of the Torah as the purpose of God in creation. The rabbinical glorification of the Torah appears to be a debt which Judaism owes to Stoicism. Dr Travers Herford defends Pharisaism on the lines which one would expect: he succeeds to admiration in his task in so far as

he is concerned with misrepresentations of Judaism which assume that a religion can exist without some conception of Law as an external command; he does not meet the really serious criticism that for Judaism religion can never rise above the conception of obedience to the revealed will of God.

As against this very interesting essay the lecture on Jesus, Paul and the Law by Dr T. W. Manson is of supreme value; it is perhaps the most important essay in the whole of the three volumes. Dr Manson brings out the fundamental contrast which the conception of the Kingdom of God, present on earth in the life of Jesus and proclaimed by Him as the supreme reality, present here and now and enabling man to achieve what was impossible for him to do by his own efforts, offers to the conception of the Torah as the revealed will of God which man must obey. As Dr Manson points out, the Sermon on the Mount, if taken simply as a New Torah, would be an even more impossible burden than the most rigorist interpretation of the Torah; its value lies in the fact that it reveals the heights which man can achieve if he will accept the gift of God in Christ, and his utter inability to do the will of God without that gift. And this, as Dr Manson rightly maintains, is the quintessence of Paulinism. Dr Manson is a little more Barthian than I should care to be, but I have nothing but praise for his essay.

In the remaining lectures the most interesting feature is the account of the medieval developments of Judaism by Dr Rosenthal.

WILFRED L. KNOX.

A HISTORY OF THE EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY: Vol. I. *The First Five Centuries.* By K. S. Latourette. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 18s.

The author is Professor of Missions at Yale University and has written a monumental history of Christianity in China. He has planned a work in six volumes, containing over a million words, two-thirds of which will be devoted to the period subsequent to A.D. 1500. The first volume deals with a period outside his special subject, where many readers can check his methods and results. One can only say that it is magnificent, showing such scholarship, breadth of learning, and power of marshalling facts, that in the subsequent volumes we shall feel able to trust the author implicitly. The present book does not supersede Harnack's *Expansion of Christianity*, which contains many details not found here, but for most purposes it is more useful.

No one has attempted such a task before—the story of the permeation of the meal by the leaven, the growth of the mustard seed into the greatest of all herbs. Just what was the seed? is the first question. Then, what was the soil? What elements

of the soil were taken up into the plant? Was the triumph of Christianity in Europe due to the seed, or to the soil, or to the method of cultivation? Or to a combination of all three, and if so, in what proportions? The great value of the book lies in the appraisal of these problems from the point of view of a scholar who knows how Christianity has spread in Asia and Africa without the help of the " preparation " which all confess helped in its original Mediterranean field of expansion.

Then, too, we must gratefully acknowledge the pains taken to keep to the canons of historical research and to exclude the supernatural. Just because of this limitation the probability that the expansion of the Church is primarily due to the still unexhausted vital element that came into the world with Jesus appears to the unprejudiced reader to be overwhelming.

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

A Companion to the Summa: Vol. II. *The Pursuit of Happiness.* By Walter Farrell, O.P. Sheed and Ward. 10s. 6d.

Why " Companion "? Is not this the stuff of the Summa itself, offered to the believing public with all the enthusiasm of good salesmanship? American Catholics, predisposed in its favour, but hitherto inattentive to its claims, will buy and not repent. More detached customers will notice that there is better knowledge shown about the goods extolled than about the rival makes disparaged with such confident generality—when for example they are told of " the great throng who would like . . . to put the whole responsibility [for human action] upon God, particularly [for human] sin—Pelagius, Calvin, Zwingli" (p. 299); or, a little lower down, how, according to Luther, " all that God Himself can do is to blink at [men's] sins and pretend they are not there." If the salesman wishes to add plausibility to preference, he must show some understanding of the rival makes, and it is here that Fr Farrell fails.

His " Companion " is in fact a popular digest of the matter of the great Summa: it is ultimately to be complete, and the second volume happens to appear first. This covers *Prima Secundæ*, ethics and grace; and Fr Farrell rightly proclaims " Man is *man* " as the cornerstone of the Thomist position about both. But he scarcely allows it to appear that there is any real difficulty in accepting to-day the notion of a fixed species (manhood); or that it is any harder than it was in the thirteenth century to agree on a body of evident precepts of reason as the sufficient guide to human conduct. St Thomas was careful to understand his opponents: his expositor prefers a bewildered derision.

He gives us, then, no serious reconsideration, but rather an able and vigorous statement, of Thomism; he gets it across to

the common man, and applies it to our needs, like a good preacher; the less reflection there is, the less dilution is there of St Thomas, and the better suited is the book to be a practical introduction to the saint's thought, for those who like a wealth of homely illustration and (to quote the author himself) that "easy familiarity of Catholics, accustomed to rubbing elbows with patriarchs, apostles, martyrs and virgins, of linking arms with the Mother of God and ushering the Son of God into the unpretentious cosiness of their own souls" (p. 308).

Under this exterior, the profound reasonableness of St Thomas impresses as always. Positive exposition is the principal task, and Fr Farrell achieves it; he would no doubt feel that it is sufficient to let the positive deliverances of Reason appeal to the reason in us: it is chiefly a question of *seeing*. This makes it the more regrettable that Fr Farrell does not feel himself free to hint that what is unreasonable in form could be redrafted without loss, nor to smile at an occasional period-piece of scholastic elaboration. He always does his best for the text of the master, and carries us over the weak places by the enthusiasm of his advocacy.

AUSTIN FARRER.

SELECTED MYSTICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LAW. Edited with notes and twenty-four studies by Stephen Hobhouse. Daniel. 8s. 6d.

A warm welcome is due to this portly volume, which brings back into circulation after many years some of the most magnificent pages in English devotional literature. It is probable that William Law is still chiefly known as the author of *A Serious Call*; a work which, though less forbidding than its title suggests, gives little promise of the spiritual reach and literary splendour of his later writings. Therefore those readers who make their first contact with his thought by way of Mr Hobhouse's "Selections" have many surprises awaiting them.

Law's development is a remarkable illustration of the fact, noted by Baron von Hügel as evidence of the organic solidarity of the Church, that no great spiritual personality ever stands alone. "Behind every saint stands another saint"—the light-bearing soul, though he may and often does feel his revelation to be immediate and unique, always as a matter of fact owes something to his predecessors, and commonly receives from one of them the torch which he is destined to hand on. In the case of William Law, though he was unusually well read in the Catholic mystics, especially the Friends of God and St John of the Cross, and probably owed something to the Cambridge Platonists, the main line of descent is interesting and unexpected. This excellent but unadventurous Georgian divine had reached that half-way house in the Christian course, where some find

an irresistible invitation to settle down, but others discover a fresh pathway to the hills. He was forty-nine when he discovered in a London bookshop one of John Sparrow's translations of Jacob Boehme's works. He opened it, and began to read. It put him, he says, "into a perfect sweat"; and from that moment his life was changed. Boehme spoke to his condition, and under the impact of that awful vision of reality desires and insights hitherto dormant in him came to life. Five years later he published the first of the series of works written under Boehme's influence—the magnificent *Appeal to all who Doubt* —and then retired from the world to Kings Cliffe, near Peterborough. Here he lived in great seclusion; following, we may suppose, the advice which he afterwards gave to those who asked how they might discover the "riches of eternity."

> "Listen not to the suggestions of thy own reason, run not on in thy own will, but be retired, silent, passive, and humbly attentive to this new risen light within thee. Open thy heart, thy eyes and ears to all its impressions. Let it enlighten, teach, frighten, torment, judge and condemn thee as it pleases, turn not away from it, hear all it says, seek for no relief out of it, consult not with flesh and blood."

Nine years of this solitary life prepared the next and perhaps the greatest of his writings, *The Spirit of Prayer*. This was followed three years later by its sequel, *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, and then by the beautiful *Spirit of Love*.

The two outstanding characters of Law's spiritual doctrine are first his vividly realistic sense of the living richness of the Divine Nature, holding within itself the contrasts of light and darkness, love and wrath; and next his insistence on the paramount importance and creative power of the will. "The will maketh the beginning, the middle, and the end of everything; it is the only workman in nature, and everything is its work." Alexander Whyte has well said of him that like his master Boehme, from whom, of course, the main outlines of his system are derived, Law "moves deep down among the primitive and unfrequented roots of things." Though the simplicity and humility of his own response to God are among his most attractive characteristics, he contemplates by preference those fundamental realities which the symbols of religion are designed to express. He sees the vast operations of cosmic law, the strife between the light and the "fiery darkness," as an effect and expression of the same creative love that is at work within the "dark chamber of man's fiery soul," seeking to restore his lost relation with Reality. Because he is above all things a shepherd of souls, this restoration of our lost supernatural status is his chief concern; and a main object of his writings is to drive home the awful reality of man's spiritual situation and his responsibility

in respect of it. Man has " broken off from his true centre, his proper place in God "—a truth which contemporary history illustrates but too well. Redemption, grace, spiritual life, the new birth (for all these are partial and oblique descriptions of one vital reality) are " nothing else but so much of the life and operation of God found again in the soul " bringing man back into relation with eternity. This redeeming and transforming process, which is the secret of Christianity, is here given a profound philosophic basis as a part of the divine creative action, " the goodness of God breaking forth into a desire to communicate good . . . because He made the creature for this sole end, to receive good." In all this students of the mystics will recognize a line of teaching at once transcendental and practical, which goes back through Boehme and the *Theologica Germanica* to the Rhenish mystics of the fourteenth century. It represents a strand which has always been present in Christianity, though often lost to sight; and not the least among the services which Mr Hobhouse has rendered us is the restoration of this profound doctrine to the currency of religious thought at a moment when the Church most sorely needs it.

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

THE CHURCH AND PRIMITIVE PEOPLES. By Denys W. T. Shropshire, C.R. With a foreword by R. R. Marett. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

This book might well have borne the subtitle " A primer for missionaries " were it not that the word " primer " gives a completely wrong impression of its scope, for it is a competent study of Bantu cultural anthropology. Fr Shropshire contends that " a definite course in the study of anthropology is a *sine qua non* for the Christian missionary," and he lays a solid foundation for such a course in the first part of his book. We are first given a picture of the communal life of the Bantu tribes of Southern Africa, which is followed by a detailed account of the " quasi-individual aspect." The Bantu tribe is a group in which the individual finds his place in an intensely social relationship. But Fr Shropshire does not leave the matter there. Like his predecessor in the same field, M. Junod, he is primarily concerned with the propagation of the Gospel of God. He is at pains, therefore, to show that the Bantu tribal community is above all things permeated with religion. A large amount of evidence is drawn from the acknowledged authorities, and amplified from the author's long experience of close contact with the Bantu.

In the second part of the book Fr Shropshire goes on to consider the moral and religious values implied in Bantu life, and their potentialities as a means of approach to the Gospel

and the Catholic faith. In the beliefs and cultus associated with the worship of tribal and family ancestors the author shows that the Bantu take it for granted that every act of their social life should be blessed and consecrated by the gods. He suggests that the attitude of trust and reverence should be gradually transferred from the ancestors to the Supreme Being in whose existence the Bantu believe, though they regard Him as comparatively distant. Fr Shropshire urges that " the light of this religious worship has redeemed the Bantu from materialism and kept their faculty of devotion alive." Those whose contact with the Bantu has largely been with the detribalized will appreciate the enormous loss they have sustained in this regard. But the obvious sympathy of the author does not lead him to disregard the moral limitation of Bantu beliefs. The society to which the individual owes social duty is confined in practice to his own tribe. A sense of duty towards fellow-tribesmen does not argue a similar attitude towards fellow-men in general. Again, Bantu morality has a predominantly legal content. An accused person is not expected to tell the truth against himself, and may even lie, until the case against him is proven. Nevertheless, the implications of Bantu beliefs are genuine moral obligations, upholding the family, maintaining order in the tribe, and containing at least the seed of the development of conscience. These chapters show that it is not quite true of the Bantu that " the heathen in his blindness bows down to wood and stone," but that there is a preparation for the Gospel within Bantu life and custom. The watering of the fertile ground is as important a part of missionary activity as the pruning of the tree.

Yet the Church is not only, in the author's phrase, " the heir of all the ages," but also the bearer of a universal Gospel. Salvation for men and nations originates in the transcendent order by a redemptive act of God. It is not only the enlightenment of the shadows of truth which man may perceive for himself. The difficulty of building a connecting bridge between Christian institutions and heathen counterparts becomes apparent in the author's suggestions of the means by which this could be done. Fr Shropshire argues for the modification of the " rigorist " attitude towards polygyny. He points out that polygyny is a social and moral institution inseparably knit up with the life of the people, and that the attitude of the Church towards paganism in earlier centuries provides sufficient precedent for the relaxing of the present rules with regard to the acceptance of polygynists for baptism. He makes his appeal solely on behalf of those who have contracted polygynous marriages in a heathen state and afterwards desire to enter the Church. It is urged that these marriages constitute genuine obligations undertaken in good faith, and that the present rule, which requires the polygynist to sever marital relations with all save one wife, can

be productive of much evil. Fr Shropshire disavows any desire to lower the standards delivered to the Church by Christ, but appeals to the Church to show, in this matter, readiness to help and forgive. But it may be replied that it is one thing for the Church to pronounce the forgiveness of God for those who have tried and failed, and quite another for the Church deliberately to modify the requirements of candidates for baptism. This does not answer the problem set out by Fr Shropshire, but if his solution is imperfect, can another be found?

Fr Shropshire has not only demonstrated a need. He has gone far to supply it. The time has long passed, if it ever existed, when zeal and piety alone were adequate weapons in the armoury of a missionary. There is a zeal not according to knowledge which can be productive of much harm. Fr Shropshire confesses of his own beginnings as a missionary, "I was amazed at my own impertinence in desiring to impose a new and strange culture upon a primitive people with whose cultural inheritance I was quite unacquainted." The publication of *The Church and Primitive Peoples* makes it unnecessary for others to begin likewise. "Before sowing know your ground" (p. xiii).

CHARLES MARTIN, S.S.M.

ART EXHIBITIONS

THREE SCOTTISH PAINTERS: PEPLOE, HUNTER, AND CADELL. Alex. Reid and Lefèvre, Ltd, 1A, King Street S.W. 1.

MAX ERNST. London Gallery Ltd, 28, Cork Street, W. 1.

These two exhibitions could not show a greater contrast: the former is of pictures fit for the most gentle of drawing-rooms, and the latter, of the blatant creations of one of the most lurid of the Surrealists.

As will be seen in the Exhibition of Scottish Art this month at Burlington House, the artists of Scotland never seem to indulge in heroics and profundities, but paint just the ordinary things of life thoroughly well. Peploe, Cadell, and Hunter certainly take their place in this tradition, with their pictures of flowers and coloured vases, quiet villages and lakes. At the same time, by working with the bright colours of Impressionism and by formal simplification, they achieve a grand clearness and strength of statement. Pure glistening paint is squeezed on to the canvas and fashioned into the form of a rose (Peploe, No. 34); a prosaic aspidistra is painted practically all over a large canvas (Peploe, No. 14); or a village is characterized by a plain strong church tower (Hunter, No. 22). There is a vigorous masculine ordinariness about these paintings, perhaps like Presbyterianism.

Max Ernst is at present working in Paris, having been turned out of Germany as a " depraved " artist, and the present Exhibition is in aid of Czecho-Slovakian and Jewish refugees. Such a heap of material gets written about Surrealism that one hesitates to add to it, but there is one interesting aspect which might be suggested. Some of the paintings of Max Ernst give a tremendous feeling of mystery and other-worldliness: the strange pink-looking town enveloped in complete darkness, called " L'Orage " (No. 11), or the weird green exotic growths of " La naissance du jour " (No. 51), and the effect is even more pronounced in the work of Chirico exhibited last December. This aspect of Surrealism seems to have vague analogies to the non-rational *mysterium tremendum* of the nature of God, as analysed by Rudolf Otto in his book *The Idea of the Holy*. This would explain, as the Surrealists themselves have discovered, the many analogies to their own work in pre-Renaissance Christian art, such as that of Hieronymus Bosch. If we turn also to the literature of Surrealism, phrases continually occur which might well apply to Christian Mysticism. Thus from articles by Dr Pailthorpe and André Breton come " Surrealism is one of the outcomes of a demand, on the part of those dissatisfied with the world, for the complete liberation of mankind from all fetters . . ."; " Thought's *dictation* in the absence of all control exercised by the reason and outside all æsthetic and moral preoccupations "; " The object of Surrealism is to know the self "; " . . . that primordial necessity—man's need of emancipation."

However, we cannot by any stretch of the imagination say that Surrealism and Mysticism are identical activities, nor could this be expected since one is based on the Revelation of God and the other is not. Surrealism professes to be based on the " *sub*-conscious," while Christianity involves, to use Otto's phrase, the " *supra*-rational." This antithesis is reflected in the eroticism of the former, and in such statements as " the understanding of the world around us is reached by means of our sense organs, and if these are not functioning freely, we are not capable of getting an accurate focus upon the happenings that affect us " (Dr Pailthorpe). Christian belief implies " only if we have an accurate focus upon the happenings that affect us, are our sense organs able to function freely (in the right sense of the word 'freely')." The former outlook, if taken seriously, evidently leads straight to the lunatic asylum wherein the Saints of Surrealism take their rest. The latter is part of St Paul's old story of justification by faith all over again.

GILBERT N. WALTON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: J. B. S. Haldane, *The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences* (5s.).

A.L.C.I. (Rome): B. Gut, *Introductio in Novum Testamentum* (30 l.).

BENNETT (Salisbury): S. P. T. Prideaux, *John Prideaux* (Bishop of Worcester, 1641-50) (1s.).

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE: J. F. Arendzen, *Faith and Common Sense* (6s.); D. Attwater, *A Dictionary of Saints* (9s.)—A useful work of reference, which will also serve as an index to the twelve volumes of Butler's *Lives of the Saints*, edited by Fr Thurston.

BOW: E. Oldmeadow, *A Layman's Christian Year* (7s. 6d.); Luigi Sturzo, *Politics and Morality* (7s. 6d.).

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: M. O. Anderson, *Animal Carvings in British Churches* (5s.); P. Gardner-Smith, *Saint John and the Synoptic Gospels* (5s.).

CENTRAL READERS' BOARD: *Readers and Sub-deacons* (new edition) (2s.).

T. AND T. CLARK: W. Adams Brown, *The Minister, His World and His Work* (7s.).

JAMES CLARKE: Natalie Victor, *A Catholic Looks at War* (2s. 6d.); D. P. Thomson (ed.), *The Professor as Preacher* (5s.); G. H. Richardson, *Biblical Archæology: Its Use and Abuse* (3s. 6d.); E. L. Allen, *What Think Ye?* (2s. 6d.).

EDITIONS CASTERMAN (Tournai): J. Coppens, *L'Histoire Critique de l'Ancien Testament* (12 fr.).

THE EPWORTH PRESS: R. Newton Flew, *Jesus and His Church* (6s.).

FAITH PRESS: C. E. Douglas, *The Last Word in Prophecy* (18s.).

HODDER AND STOUGHTON: K. Barth, *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God* (12s. 6d.).

INTER-VARSITY FELLOWSHIP OF EVANGELICAL UNIONS: T. C. Hammond, *Perfect Freedom: An Introduction to Christian Ethics* (5s.); T. Walker, *Missionary Ideals* (1s.).

JOHN LANE: C. S. Lewis, *Out of the Silent Planet* (7s. 6d.).

LONGMANS: T. Wesseling, *Liturgy and Life* (3s. 6d.).

MACMILLAN: Shailer Matthews, *The Church and the Christian* (8s. 6d.).

METHUEN: E. O. James, *Comparative Religion* (9s.); Hugh Kingsmill, *D. H. Lawrence* (10s. 6d.).

MURBY: T. M. Knox, *Plato's Republic*; J. C. Hardwick, *Totalitarianism* (1s. each) —useful additions to the Interpreter Series.

NISBET: C. H. Dodd, *History and the Gospel* (6s.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: Charles Williams, *Taliessin Through Logres* (6s.); E. L. Woodward, *The Age of Reform*, 1815-70 (15s.).

PAX HOUSE: W. E. Lutyens, *After His Likeness* (2s. 6d.); W. E. Lutyens, *Calvary* (2s.).

PLOUGH PUBLISHING HOUSE (Ashton Keynes): E. Arnold, *The Individual and World Need* (3s.).

RICH AND COWAN: A. Herbert Gray, *Love: the One Solution* (3s. 6d.).

SHEED AND WARD: E. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (10s. 6d.).

W. SHIRLEY (Author, 58, Banbury Road, Oxford): *Why and Whether Bible Studies* (1s. 6d. post free).

S.C.M. PRESS: H. E. Fosdick, *A Guide to Understanding the Bible* (10s. 6d.); John Macmurray, *Creative Society* (2s. 6d.)—a cheap edition of an important book reviewed here in June, 1936; J. Macmurray, *The Clue to History* (7s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: H. Beevor and A. H. Rees, *The Infallibility of the Church* (1s.); H. S. Box, *Spiritual Exercises* (3s. 6d.); H. Caiger, *Sunday Afternoon* (2s. 6d.); C. M. Chavasse, *Christ and Fairies* (2s. 6d.); J. R. Lumb (ed.), *Power and Witness* (2s. 6d. paper, 3s. 6d. cloth)—the S.P.C.K. Bible Class Book for 1938-39; A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, Part II, vol. i. (6s.); R. C. West, *Western Liturgies* (5s.).

TEMPEST (Dundalk): Claude Chavasse, *Public Worship According to the Use of the Church of Ireland* (1s.).

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